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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are about to purchase a new car from an auto dealer. The car
has 972 miles on the odometer, but the sales person assures you that those miles took
place on their lot from test drives and sales persons' use of the car. The sales person
assures you that there was no prior owner of the car (this point being important since
if the car had a previous title holder it would reduce the value of the car). You pay
the value of the car as a new car with 972 miles on it but discover when you receive
the title to the car that the car in fact was previously titled to someone else. The
value of the car is consequently $4,000 less than what you paid for it. If the dealer
denies that its sales person lied to you and does not return the $4,000 to you, would
you hire an attorney to bring a lawsuit to redress this wrong? What if you were told
that it would cost you $34,183 to successfully litigate the case? These are the facts in
Wilkins v. PeninsulaMotor Cars, Inc.' A typical consumer under these facts would
not rationally choose to hire an attorney to pursue a claim like this because the costs
to litigate the case exceed the amount of the consumer's damages from the fraud.'
However, to combat this problem and to discourage businesses from being able to
make fraud profitable, forty-five of the fifty states have enacted consumer fraud and
deceptive practices statutes that provide for the possibility of attorney's fees to a
prevailing plaintiff in a consumer fraud or deceptive practices case.3 Due to these
statutes, consumers are better able to protect themselves when they have been
defrauded or deceived by now being able to hire competent attorneys willing to take
on their cases. In addition, through these statutes, unscrupulous businesses face a
stronger deterrent to committing such fraud and deceptive practices since they are
more likely to encounter a lawsuit in reaction to their fraudulent or deceptive
practices than if no attorney's fees are awarded to the prevailing consumer.
However, the wording of some of these consumer fraud statutes regarding the
recovery of attorney's fees may, in fact, impede the legislative goal of encouraging
the bringing of meritorious cases. For example, while some state statutes make very
clear that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees,4 a number of

'587 S.E.2d 581, 582 (Va. 2003).
2

See infra Part II.

3

Because the state's resources are limited, providing for attorney's fees to a prevailing
plaintiff encourages more lawsuits, which not only leads to compensation of past victims but
also potentially reduce future fraud.
4

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2008); ALASKA STAT. §
45.50.537 (2008); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1780(C)(2)(c) (Deering 2008); COLO. REv. STAT.ANN. §
6-1-113(2.5) West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-373 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-607
(2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (2008); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 213(2)
(2008); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (LexisNexis 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 358-A:10
(LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:7-32 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10
(LexisNexis 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-10 (2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 761.1(A)

(West 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(8) (2008); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d)
(Vernon 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2461(b) (2008); WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. § 19.86.090
(West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 425.308(1) (West 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(b)

(2008).
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state statutes (or court interpretations of these statutes) 5 provide instead that the
prevailing plaintiff may be ordered attorney's fees at the discretion of the court.6 This
discretion creates a level of uncertainty that might very well discourage attorneys
from taking on even a strong meritorious consumer fraud case where the consumer is
not in a position to pay the attorney's fees or where the attorney's fees are likely to
eclipse the amount at issue in the case. It is also hypothesized that in this scenario
the consumer is less likely to decide to bring the case. This Article tests these
hypotheses empirically by surveying consumers and attorneys on the likelihood that
they would bring consumer fraud cases to court under different provisions regarding
attorney's fees, such as when they are discretionary versus required. If this
discretionary language causes consumers and lawyers to be less likely to decide to
bring even a strong meritorious consumer fraud case, then the articulated legislative
policy to promote the bringing of such cases is being impeded by language and
statutes that contain this type of discretionary language, and these statutes should be
modified to eliminate such discretion by the courts.
To further complicate the calculus of costs and benefits in bringing an action,
some of the state consumer fraud statutes provide that, in the discretion of the court,
the court may award a prevailing defendant her attorney's fees. This broad
provision, not necessarily confined to the situation where the plaintiff has brought a
frivolous case, may impede the legislative goals of encouraging consumers to bring
meritorious cases7 and, consequently, to deter fraud against consumers. Our survey,
5

See, e.g., Vista Resorts, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 117 P.3d 60 (Colo. Ct. App.
2004) (clarifying that Colorado's Consumer Protection Act mandates reasonable attorney's

fees to a successful claimant). But see Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 207 (Colo. 2006) (ruling
that "[a]n injured party who prevails under the [Colorado Consumer Protection Act] may
recover treble damages and attorney's fees") (emphasis added); see also Advanced Constr.
Corp. v. Pilecki, 901 A.2d 189,198 (Me. 2006) ("A person who has suffered a loss of money
or property as the result of an unfair or deceptive trade practice under the [Unfair Trade
Practices Act] may also 'be awarded reasonable attorney's fees."' (quoting ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 213(2) (2005))) (emphasis added).
6

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110(d) (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. §

501.2105(5) (LexisNexis 2008); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481A-4(b) (LexisNexis 2008); 815
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a(c) (LexisNexis 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4
(LexisNexis 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(e) (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.220(3)
(LexisNexis 2008); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-408 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP.
LAWS SERV. § 445.911(2) (LexisNexis 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.694(e) (West 2008);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.025(2) (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(3) (2008); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (Consol. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-16 (West 2008); OHIo.
REV. CODE. ANN. § 1345.09(F) (LexisNexis 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.638(3) (West
2008); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2(a) (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-5.2(a)
(2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(e)(1) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(5) (2008);
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-444 (2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-104 (LexisNexis 2008).
7
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(d) (Deering 2008) (where a plaintiff's prosecution is not
in good faith); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481A-4 (LexisNexis 2008) (where the plaintiff's
action is groundless); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-608(5) (2008) (where a plaintiff's action is
spurious or brought for harassment purposes); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a(c)
(LexisNexis 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (where the defendant
prevails); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(3)(e)(1) (2008) (where the consumer brings an action he
knows to be groundless); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.220 (LexisNexis 2008) (where the
defendant is the prevailing party); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (2008) (where an action
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therefore, also sought to discover how the possibility of awarding attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant might affect the decision making of attorneys and consumers
regarding initiating a lawsuit even when the consumer has a very strong meritorious
case. If it turns out that the possibility of a prevailing defendant recovering her
attorney's fees reduces the likelihood that consumers and attorneys would bring a
claim, even for a meritorious case that is characterized as a strong case, then this
variation on attorney's fees is contrary to the legislative goals in creating the
attorney's fees provisions and should be modified.
Our survey also sought to test the decision making process of consumers and
attorneys under the various forms of statutory attorney's fees provisions in the
scenario where the plaintiff is raising a good faith claim but where success is very
unclear. One such scenario where policy dictates that such cases should be
encouraged is the situation where the consumer is bringing a claim that is on some
level a matter of first impression in the jurisdiction but where another jurisdiction
might have case law in support of the plaintiff's contention. A survey of attorneys
and consumers presented in this article tests how likely consumers and attorneys are
to bring a case in this scenario under the various forms of attorney's fees provisions
in consumer fraud statutes. We hypothesized that not only are attorneys and
consumers less likely, in general, to bring such cases compared with the situation
where their chance of success is characterized as very strong, but we also
hypothesized that the consumer's and attorney's willingness to bring a good faith
action are also significantly reduced when the court can award attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant, even when the plaintiff has not brought a frivolous case. If the
surveys confirm this hypothesis, then policy articulated by legislatures to encourage
meritorious consumer fraud claims dictates that they revise their attorney's fees
provisions to clarify that defendants recover their attorney's fees only when the
plaintiff's case is frivolous.
The consumer fraud statutes that provide for attorney's fees to a prevailing
defendant do so in order to achieve the goal of discouraging non-meritorious (i.e.
frivolous) claims by consumers and their attorneys. 8 Since some consumer fraud
is "groundless and brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment"); MD.CODE ANN. CoM.
LAW § 13-408(c) (LexisNexis 2008) (where an action is brought in bad faith or is frivolous);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15 (2007) (where an action is "frivolous or filed for the purpose of
harassment or delay"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133 (2007) (where the defendant prevails);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(E)(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (where the plaintiff's action is
groundless or filed in bad faith), OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 646.638(3) (West 2005) (where the
defendant prevails, except in a class action); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(e)(2) (2008)
(where plaintiff's action is frivolous, without merit, or brought for the purpose of harassment);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(5)(a) (20078 (where the defendant is the prevailing party and the
plaintiff brought an action he knew to be groundless); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-104
(LexisNexis 2008) (where the action is "brought in bad faith and for the purposes of
harassment").
8
Courts have interpreted attorney's fees in consumer protection statutes to encourage
consumer litigation for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., Shands v. Castrovinci, 340 N.W.2d 506,
509 (Wis. 1983) (encouraging consumer litigation to remove disincentives for individuals to
bring legal actions because "the amount of pecuniary loss is [often] small," to enforce not only
his or her individual rights but in the aggregate the public's rights as well, to strengthen the
bargaining power of consumers, and "provide a necessary backup to the state's enforcement
powers"); see also Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Starling, 470 A.2d 1157, 1162 (Vt.
1983) (encouraging consumer litigation "to promote and encourage prosecution of individual
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statutes provide for not only attorney's fees but also punitive damages under certain
circumstances and potentially lucrative class-action matters, there is a potential
economic incentive for consumers and their attorneys to bring non-meritorious
claims in the hope of extracting a settlement from the big-pocket defendants.9 With
this possibility in mind, we surveyed consumers and attorneys to investigate the
decision making process of consumers and attorneys under the different statutory
attorney's fees provisions in scenarios where the consumer would bring a claim
without merit under the law in the hope of extracting a settlement from the
defendant. We hypothesized that most attorneys are not willing to bring a nonmeritorious case since there are ethical and civil procedure rules that already prohibit

consumer claims" (citing Wilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 309, 310 (Vt.
1981))); Beslity v. Manhattan Honda, 120 Misc. 2d 848, 852 (N.Y. App. Term 1983)
(encouraging consumer litigation to make up for the "inability of the New York State
Attorney-General to adequately police false advertising and deceptive trade practices"); St.
Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Smith, 568 A.2d 35, 46 (Md. 1990) (encouraging
consumer litigation "to equalize the position of the parties" (citing Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The
Legal Theory of Attorney Fee-Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 663-64
(1982)).
9

However, bringing a bad-faith or frivolous claim is a violation of ethical rules. See
Rule 3.1 states "a lawyer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and
fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law." Most states follow the format of the ABA Model
Rules or Model Code of Professional Conduct except for California, which has developed its
own rules. See American Legal Ethics Library, Topical Overview - Index of Narratives,
Not only are such claims an
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/comparative/index.htm#3.1.
ethical violation, but they also violate the federal and state rules of civil procedure. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 11; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (Deering 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105
(LexisNexis 2007); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 137; MD. R. 1-341; N.Y. CT. R. 130-1.1(a); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §2323.51(2) (LexisNexis 2008). Rule 1I states that representations to the court
must be "warranted by existing law or by a non frivolous argument for extending, modifying,
or reversing existing law or for establishing new law[.]" FED. R. Civ. P. lI(b)(l). Upon
violating this rule, the court has the authority to impose sanctions on the attorney in breach.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(c)(2). The parties to the action may be liable for sanctions as well. See De
Vaux v. Westwood Baptist Church, 953 So. 2d 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (stating in the
"expert commentary," supplied by Judge David M. Gertsen, that sanctions may be applied to
an attorney or to the attorney and the client for filing meritless actions, motions, defenses, and
appeals); Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1990)
(affirming the district court's decision to sanction an attorney whose inclusion of defendant in
the cause of action was "essentially vindictive"); West Coast Dev. v. Reed, 2 Cal. App. 4th
693, 704 (1992) (sanctioning plaintiff where his complaint included frivolous counts). Prior to
amendment of Rule 1I in 1993, the overwhelming majority of cases imposed attorney's fees
of the opposing party as the "'sanction' and in response to criticism of this, Rule 11 was
amended to state that the court may order payment of 'some or all of the reasonable attorney's
fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation' if such cost-shifting is
'warranted for effective deterrence."' Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis
of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, MeritoriousSuits, and the
Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 395 (1996) (quoting Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms (transmitted to Congress on April 22, 1993), reprinted in
146 F.R.D. 405,423 (1993)).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).
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and sanction this.'0 However, we wanted to see if, in the rare cases where an
attorney still expressed a willingness to bring such a claim, that decision is less likely
made when the prevailing defendant could be awarded attorney's fees at the court's
discretion versus when the prevailing defendant could be awarded attorney's fees
only if the plaintiffs case is deemed frivolous. If the frivolous standard version is
equally likely to impede the bringing of non-meritorious cases as the version which
awards the prevailing defendant her attorney's fees at the discretion of the court, then
this result is further reason for the attorney's fees provisions to provide that a
prevailing defendant should only recover her attorney's fees when the plaintiff's case
is frivolous. However, if the version requiring that the plaintiffs case be frivolous
before awarding fees to the defendant is less likely to impede the bringing of nonmeritorious cases, then this result could serve as support for the attorney's fees
provisions to provide that the prevailing defendant be awarded attorney's fees at the
discretion of the court rather than only when the plaintiffs case is frivolous. Before
drawing this conclusion, the legislature should also consider the impact of such a
potentially broad granting of fees to a prevailing defendant on the bringing of
meritorious consumer fraud cases.
The issue of ensuring that victims of consumer fraud will be able to have their
day in court is particularly important today in light of the widespread and pernicious
problem of predatory home mortgage loans. It has been estimated, for example, that
fifty percent of the people who were induced by mortgage brokers to take out a high
cost sub-prime loan could have qualified for a lower cost, or prime loan, and some of
these people are now having trouble keeping up payments on these high cost loans."
Yet it is very difficult and time consuming for an attorney to litigate this type of case
in order to seek damages or rescission of the loan or to save a person from becoming
homeless or losing the equity that they put into their home.' 2 Potentially, consumer
fraud statutes could be the basis for a homeowner to recover some or all of her losses
when she was deceived into entering into an overpriced or unaffordable loan. 3 If,
10See supra note 7.
"Les Christie, Wow, I Could've had a Prime Mortgage: Why Many Borrowers Who
Qualified for Prime-Rate Loans Ended up with Subprimes Instead (May 30, 2007),
http://money.cnn.com/2007/05/29/realestate/could have had a_prime/index.htm; see also
Jonathan Peterson, Lenders Pledge Better Updates, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2008, at Al, available
at http://www.latimes.com/business/printedition/la-fi-loans8febO8,0,1 343248.story (reporting
that in 2007 alone, 931,000 delinquent subprime borrowers received assistance because they
could not keep up payment on these high cost loans).
'2See Hughes v. Cardinal Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 36 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 12, 1206, 1206
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (explaining that the lack of motivation for consumers to bring individual
TILA claims against lenders is largely due to the high litigation costs and difficulty in proving
actual damages).
13However, where the bank is subject to federal regulation, the ability of a consumer to
bring a claim under a state consumer protection law may be thwarted by preemption of federal
banking regulatory statutes, which are typically less restrictive. See Watters v. Wachovia, 127
S.Ct. 1559, 1568-69 (2007) (finding that where Michigan state bank registration laws were in
conflict with The National Bank Act's licensing, reporting, and visitorial schemes, the state
law was preempted); Illinois Ass'n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks & Real Estate,
308 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that where new Illinois regulations blocked state
lenders from extending credit on terms open under the federal Alternative Mortgage
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however, the attorney's fees provisions are drafted in a way that creates uncertainty
that the attorney will recover her attorney's fees, even if her client prevails in the
litigation, this may lead to far fewer attorneys who are willing to take on these
important but complicated cases.
Part II of the Article sets out the economic dilemma a typical consumer faces in
deciding whether to bring an action under the common law to be compensated for
her losses when she has been defrauded (the "economic feasibility" issue). It then
discusses the legislative response to the economic feasibility problem through the
awarding of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in consumer fraud cases. It also
identifies the primary legislative goals, articulated in legislative histories and in cases
interpreting consumer fraud statutes, to enable defrauded consumers to bring
consumer fraud actions and to, thereby, also deter businesses from engaging in
consumer fraud. Part III provides a summary of the different approaches among the
fifty states' consumer fraud statutes in terms of when an attorney's fees are awarded
to a successful plaintiff or to a successful defendant (and the secondary policy reason
for this). An Appendix containing a breakdown of the attorney's fees provisions and
case law interpretations of these statutes among the fifty states is also provided. Part
Transaction Parity Act of 1982, the state law was preempted when the lenders complied with
the federal regulations); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d
383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that where New York's enforcement of and investigation into
antidiscrimination lending laws directly conflicted with the National Bank Act, the state law
was preempted and the Attorney General was prohibited from investigating unfair lending
practices of national banks and their subsidiaries); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Clark, 837 N.E.2d
74 (Ill. 2005) (finding that where the Illinois Interest Act placed a limitation on lender fees for
mortgages with certain interest rates, the cap was preempted by the federal Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which placed a limit on such
caps); Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 656 P.2d 1089 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982)
(finding that where Washington's Consumer Protection Act specifically provided that the
Comptroller of the Currency has primary jurisdiction to regulate and resolve disputes arising
in the bank-customer relationship and state court decisions could potentially conflict with the
Comptroller's decisions and regulations, plaintiffs could not bring a consumer protection
claim against their lender for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud); but see In re First Alliance
Mortgage Co., 280 B.R. 246 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that consumer class's California
unfair business practices claim under state consumer protection laws were not preempted by
the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) because there was no conflict between the two laws
and TILA specifically allows state law to supplement its enforcement scheme); Anderson v.
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (finding that where
defendant mortgage company did not properly disclose the Yield Spread Premium (YSP) paid
to it by plaintiffs lender, in violation of the Real Estate Property Settlement Act (RESPA) and
TILA, the plaintiff's claim under Washington's Consumer Protection Act was not foreclosed
by the federal acts); Brazier v. Sec. Pac. Mortgage, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2003)
(finding that where defendant failed to disclose the YSP to the plaintiff as well as the fact that
it was acting as both lender and broker in plaintiff's second mortgage loan, the plaintiffs
RESPA, TILA, and Consumer Protection Act claims all survived summary judgment);
Washington Mut. Bank v. Super. Ct., 75 Cal. App. 4th 773 (1999) (finding that plaintiffs
unfair and deceptive business practices action was not preempted by RESPA and related
Regulation X since those federal statutes did not expressly preempt private rights of action
under state laws for violations of their provisions); Johnson v. Matrix Fin. Servs. Corp., 820
N.E.2d 1094 (I11.App. Ct. 2004) (finding that where a consumer is harmed by an illegal
kickback under RESPA, that consumer may be afforded the opportunity to seek redress under
Illinois' Consumer Fraud Act).
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IV critiques the attorney's fees provisions in the various consumer fraud statutes in
the United States and the court interpretations of these provisions in light of the goals
articulated for these statutes and raises questions to be empirically tested. Part V
describes the methodology and results of our surveys, which seek to determine the
impact of different statutory terms regarding the awarding of attorney's fees under
different scenarios on the likelihood that a consumer or attorney will bring a
consumer fraud case. Finally, Part VI sets forth a proposal regarding the best
approach to the awarding of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff or defendant
based upon the results of the data collected from these surveys and a consideration of
the public policy goals articulated when the consumer fraud acts were enacted.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

An estimated 25 million Americans became the victims of certain types of
consumer fraud in 2004 according to data collected by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"). 4 Often in these situations (such as purchasing a membership
in a pyramid scheme, or having one's phone service carrier change without the
consumer's permission), a very large number of consumers are affected, but the
amount of any individual consumer's loss is typically small (i.e. less than $250). 1" In
this situation, a consumer is unlikely to bring an individual lawsuit on the basis of
the common law action for fraud to recover her losses because the legal fees and
costs for the lawsuit far outweigh the amount the consumer could recover from the
lawsuit.' 6 While consumers filed 635,173 complaints with the FTC in 2004 for
matters which fell within the ten categories compiled by the FTC,17 only 2.4% of the
consumers surveyed who believed that they had been defrauded consulted with a
lawyer, 8 even though 46.3% reported that they were not satisfied after directly
seeking recovery from the party who had defrauded them.'9 With limited resources,
the FTC clearly can not respond to so many consumer complaints each year. One
potential method to make it economically feasible for a consumer to bring a private
4
1 Keith

B. Anderson, FED. TRADE COMM'N, Consumer Fraud in the United States: An
Survey, FTC Staff Rep. 28 (2004) http://www.ftc.gov/reports/consumerfraud

FTC

/040805confraudrpt.pdf.
5

The median losses to victims who reported experiencing one or more of the types of
fraud investigated by the FTC lost $220 (although the median loss from credit repair fraud
came in at $300 and seventy-five percent of those surveyed who had experienced a loss from
fraud said they paid or lost $630 or less). Anderson, supra note 12, at 38-39.
16An interview with an attorney who litigates consumer fraud cases on behalf of
consumers indicated that the amount of hours necessary to litigate a consumer fraud case
varies greatly based on the reaction of the defendant. Some cases may settle quickly, but
plaintiffs run the risk of engaging in litigation that may take over two years costing upwards of
$50,000-60,000. A home improvement fraud case can take this long because of the multitude
of discovery that is required along with expert testimony. Interview with Anonymous in
Chicago, I11.(March 7, 2008) (note: the interviewee did not want his or her name disclosed).
17Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Releases Top 10 Consumer Complaint Categories for 2004,
Feb. 1, 2005, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/02/topl02005.shtm.
18Anderson, supra note 12, at 80.
19Anderson, supra note 12, at 80, 103-04.
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consumer fraud claim when thousands of consumers are affected but the damages to
each is low is the filing of a class action on behalf of all those injured. In general,
20
however, it is very difficult to meet the requirements to certify a class action.
Furthermore, it is especially difficult to meet these requirements for class action
status in the context of a consumer fraud claim because of each plaintiff's
individualized reliance or individualized harm. 21 Due to these difficulties, it is likely
that a large number of consumer fraud claims are not able to be brought in the
context of a class action case and, consequently, many consumers are left without an
economically viable option to litigate their claims without an award of attorney's
fees.
In addition to the high volume of consumer fraud in the ten categories tracked by
the FTC22 where large numbers of consumers are affected but the average consumer
loss is usually low, consumers are also defrauded in contexts where they could be
individually losing thousands of dollars. These include home improvement scams,
where contractors take money from the homeowners at the start of the job to "pay for
materials" but then disappear and never perform, or predatory home mortgage loans,
where consumers are tricked into entering into overpriced and unaffordable home
loans. Predatory loans often occur in the sub-prime lending market, where the total
number of sub-prime loans has nearly tripled since 2001, nearly outnumbering the
total number of prime loan originations in 2006.23 As previously noted, it is
estimated that as many as 50% of those who received a high cost home loan could
have qualified for a lower cost loan. 24 An estimated 10.3% of American homeowners
(approximately 8.8 million people) now owe more than their homes are worth, an

20

For example, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth four
requirements that the plaintiff must satisfy to obtain class certifications: (i) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable ("numerosity"); (ii) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class ("commonality"); (iii) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class ("typicality"); and (iv)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class
("adequacy of representation"). FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Many state rules of civil procedure have
similar requirements to these federal rules, but because some states rules were more liberal
with certifying class actions, this led to forum shopping and complaints from business
interests. This, in turn, led Congress to enact the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1711 (2006) which expanded diversity jurisdiction for larger classes to facilitate removal of
the cases to the federal courts.
2t
See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, 155 F. 3d 331, 340-41 (4th Cir.
1998); Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953, 966 (8th Cir. 2002); O'Sullivan v.
Countrywide Home Loans, 319 F.3d 732, 742 (5th Cir. 2003); Turpeau v. Fidelity Fin. Servs.,
936 F. Supp. 975, 978 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
22
Those categories are: advance fee loans, buyers' clubs, credit card insurance, credit
repair, prizes, internet services, pyramid schemes, information services, government job
offers, and business opportunities. Anderson, supra note 14, at 29 (fig.3-1).
23

JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE

NATION'S

HOUSING

(2007),

http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2007/

son 2007.pdf.
24

Christie, supra note 9.
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epidemic unseen since the depression." Predatory home loans ending in foreclosure
(15.8% of sub-prime loans) have cost homeowners as much as $164 billion between
1998 and the third quarter of 2006.26 Further analysis of those home loans
originating in 2005-2006 shows that sub-prime foreclosures will also result in a $202
billion decrease in home values and tax base, with this devaluation affecting nearly
40.6 neighboring homes.2 ' Americans have also been the victims of home
improvement scams. In Illinois alone, there were 3,204 consumer construction and
home improvement complaints to the attorney general in 2 0 0 6 .1 Indeed, according
to a study conducted by the American Association of Retired Persons in 1998,
seventeen percent of those surveyed indicated that they had been the victim of a
major swindle or fraud at some time during their lifetime. 9
As previously noted, even when the consumer fraud takes place in contexts
where the consumer is losing thousands of dollars or more, certain required elements
to make out a cause of action for common law fraud can be very difficult" and
25

Edmund L. Andrews & Louis Uchitelle, Rescues for Homeowners in Debt Weighed,

N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/business/
22 homes.html.
26
Center of Responsible Lending, Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the Subprime Market
and Their Cost to Homeowners 3, 15 (2006), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/
CRL-foreclosure-rprt-1-8.pdf.
27

CENTER OF RESPONSIBLE LENDING,

SUBPRIME SPILLOVER: FORECLOSURES COST

$202 BILLION; 40/6 MILLION HOMES LOSE $5000 ON AVERAGE 1 (2008),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/subprime-spillover.pdf.
28
Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Madigan Announces Top Ten Consumer
Complaints for 2006, http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressroom/2007_01/20070129.html.
29
Anderson, supra note 12, at 3.
3°Under the common law action for fraud, courts commonly required that the followings
elements be proven: (i) the defendant made a false statement of material fact to the plaintiff;
(ii) the defendant knew the statement was false and intended for the plaintiff to detrimentally
rely on it; (iii) the plaintiff detrimentally and reasonably or justifiably relied on the statement;
and (iv) the plaintiff was harmed from the false statement. Some of these elements are
difficult for a consumer to prove when they have been defrauded or deceived by a supplier of
goods or services, such as proving the defendant "knew" the statement was false. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hopps, 331 F.2d 332, 337-38 (4th Cir. 1964) ("Fraudulent intent, as a mental
element of crime, (it has been observed) is too often difficult to prove by direct and
convincing evidence. In many cases it must be inferred from a series of seemingly isolated
acts and instances which have been rather aptly designated as badges of fraud."). Thus,
consumer fraud statutes have eliminated the requirement that the plaintiff show that the
defendant knew his statement was false. See, e.g., Sheldon Gardner & Robert Kuehl,
NEIGHBORS

Acquiring an Historical Understanding of Duties to Disclose, Fraud, and Warranties, 104

COM. L.J. 168, 188 (1999) ("[I]t is easier for a plaintiff to prevail under a consumer fraud
claim because the scienter element of common-law fraud is absent, and intent is not as
difficult to prove."). Another difficult element to prove under a common law action for fraud
is that the plaintiff "reasonably" relied on the false statement. For example, if the defendant
lied to the plaintiff (say about the extent of termite damage to a home), and the plaintiff relied
upon what she was told, and did not independently investigate the truth of what she was told,
even when she has notice of a problem from the termite report (although the true extent of the
problem was not disclosed in the termite report), under the common law action for fraud she
would lose because she had not "reasonably" relied on the seller's and broker's false
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expensive to prove, making the private lawsuit under a common law fraud action,
where there is no recovery for attorney's fees, too expensive and uncertain to truly be
of use to consumers and causing fraud "to pay" for disreputable companies and
businesses.3 In an extreme example of the difficulties and expenses that are involved
in litigating these cases, the plaintiffs attorneys in Taylor v. Medenica,32 spent over
1,500 hours to successfully litigate a case involving a claim under the South Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act in response to a vigorous defense mounted by the
defendants. The court in that case awarded the plaintiff $108,000 in damages and
statements. Robertson v. Boyd, 363 S.E.2d 672 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). The trial court in
Robertson took this approach, but the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Id.at 675-76. The Robertson court affirmed the trial court's ruling for the defendants under
the common law action for fraud, but ruled that under the state's consumer fraud act the
plaintiff did not have to reasonably rely (i.e. the defense of contributory negligence by the
plaintiff was not available). Id. at 676. Because consumers are typically not sophisticated,
and rely on what they are told without carefully reviewing the contract they sign to verify the
truth of what they have been told, consumer fraud statutes, typically do not require a showing
of "reasonable" reliance. See id. (ruling that the defense of contributory negligence was not
available to the defendant because the plaintiff was a home purchaser, unlike the plaintiff in
Libby Hill Seafood Restaurants v. Owens, 303 S.E.2d 565, 569 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983), where
the plaintiff in a common law fraud action "was a sophisticated corporation engaged in an
expensive venture[,]" and the court ruled against the plaintiff based on the defense of
contributory negligence). Indeed many of the consumer fraud statutes do not explicitly require
reliance at all, but instead, simply require that the plaintiff show that the defendant's false or
deceptive statement caused the plaintiff damages, but some argue that this "causation"
requirement expressed in the statutes implies the "reliance" element as well. See, Sheila B.
Scheuerman, The Consumer FraudClass Action: Reining in Abuse by Requiring Plaintiffs to
Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 44-45 (2006). But even if
the causation requirement implies reliance, this leaves open whether the legislatures intended
not only "reliance" but "reasonable" or "justifiable" reliance. Some courts have ruled that
legislatures did not intend to bar actions by consumers who are typically unsophisticated from
recovering on the basis that their reliance was unreasonable or unjustifiable. See, e.g.,
Wiegand v. Walser Auto. Groups, 683 N.W. 2d 807, 812-13 (Minn. 2004) ("[T]he Consumer
Fraud Act reflects the legislature's intent 'to make it easier to sue for consumer fraud than it
had been to sue for fraud at common law' . . . . [A] private consumer fraud class action does
not necessarily require the justifiable reliance standard of common law fraud. We conclude
that the existence of a written contract that contradicts Walser's alleged oral
misrepresentations does not, as a matter of law, negate any possibility of Weigand and
potentially others proving a causal nexus between oral representations and consumer
injuries.") (quoting State v. Alpine Air Prods., 500 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Minn. 1993)).
3
'The Legal Assistance Fund of Metropolitan Chicago suggested that the cases they take
involving alleged predatory lending and foreclosure usually take approximately twenty-four
months until a settlement is reached. This time frame encompasses over 100 hours spent on
most cases, while some may take over 200 hours. A conservative estimate of 150 hours spent
per case totals approximately $30,000. The typical remedy sought is a loan modification or a
payoff where the borrower pays off the loan at the lower amount and obtains a loan elsewhere
at an affordable rate. There is no monetary award, but this allows the borrower to save their
home, retain equity, or even increase equity. There have been cases where $50,000 in equity
was saved, but the savings can often times be even more than this. Interview with Daniel P.
Lindsey, Supervising Attorney of the Home Ownership Preservation Project, Legal Assistance
Found. of Metro. Chicago, in Chicago, Ill.
(Feb. 28, 2008, Mar. 6, 2008).
32503 S.E.2d 458, 462 (S.C. 1998).
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attorney's fees of $500,000, and the attorney's fees award was upheld on appeal.
Had there been no consumer protection statute authorizing attorney's fees, the case
would not have been economically feasible for the plaintiff to file. In a more typical
example of how the attorney's fees can exceed the amount the consumer is damaged,
the court in Jordan v. TransnationalMotors, Inc.33 awarded the consumer damages
of $7,600 for defects with a car the plaintiff purchased and attorney's fees of $21,000
based on the hours the plaintiff's attorney spent on the case in bringing a claim under
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and under the Michigan Consumer Protection
Act. Although it may initially seem misguided to award attorney's fees far in excess
of the amount the plaintiff recovers, the court in Jordan explained it well:
In consumer protection as this, the monetary value of the case is typically
low . . . . [I]f attorney fee awards in these cases do not provide a
reasonable return, it will be economically impossible for attorneys to
represent their clients. Thus, practically speaking, the door to the
courtroom will be closed to all but those with either potentially substantial
damages, or those with sufficient economic resources to afford the
litigation expenses involved. Such a situation would indeed be ironic: it is
but precisely those with ordinary consumer complaints and those who
cannot afford their attorney fees for whom these remedial acts are
intended.34
Under the U.S. legal system where a prevailing party is not awarded attorney's
fees (unless a contract at issue calls for attorney's fees or a statute provides for this
remedy), if the cost of hiring an attorney to litigate the case exceeds the amount at
stake, the aggrieved party will normally not bring a lawsuit for a redress of
grievances, and this result is acceptable in the typical litigation matter. But when
important policy reasons exist to promote the bringing of certain litigation, Congress
and state legislatures can and have enacted statutes which provide for attorney's fees
to the prevailing plaintiff to encourage and enable such litigation. There are many
examples of such statutes at both the state and federal level, and many relate to
actions that are considered particularly pernicious, such as discrimination against
certain classes of persons in employment and housing.35 The problem of sharp and
33537 N.W. 2d 471, 473-74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
34

474.
See, e.g., The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006); The Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006); The Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (2006);
The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 1640(a) (2008); The Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 46
U.S.C. § 58106(c)(l)-(2) (2006). See also Alabama's Litigation Accountability Act, ALA.
CODE §12-19-272(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (awarding "reasonable attorneys' fees and costs" for
"any civil action commenced or appealed in any court of record in the state"); Alaska's Wage
and Hour Act, ALASKA STAT. §23.10.110(c) (2008); Arizona's Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, ARjz. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-1062(A) (2008); California's
Code of Civil Procedure, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §1021.5 (Deering 2008) (allowing a possible
recovery of attorney's fees "in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest"); Colorado's Liability for Computer
Dissemination of Indecent Material to Children Act, Co. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-1003(7)
(West 2008); Connecticut's Occupational Safety and Health Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-379(c) (2008) (allowing recovery when an employer retaliates against a whistleblower);
1d. at

35
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unscrupulous suppliers of goods and services deceiving and defrauding consumers is
also an example of a pervasive and pernicious practice that the federal government36
and all fifty state legislatures have enacted legislation to combat.
When New Jersey passed its Consumer Fraud Act in 1960, it did so "to combat
'
the increasingly widespread practice of defrauding the consumer"37
by enacting a law
that contained provisions for private causes of action, an award of treble damages,
attorney's fees, and costs in order to "provide 'easier access to the courts for the
consumer,

. . .

increase the attractiveness of consumer actions to attorneys and...

also help reduce the burdens on the Division of Consumer Affairs.""'3 The attorney
general stated to the senators at that time:
We found through our study that consumers are often without adequate
remedy for redressing violations such as those contained in the Consumer
Fraud Act. In addition, we found that consumers most often cannot afford
the cost of pursuing what remedies they do have available and that
attorneys are not generally attracted to individual consumer suits which
involve a great amount of work and very little monetary award.
Consequently, we included the above private right of action in order to
provide a vehicle for private consumer redress, to make that vehicle
economically feasible to the private consumer and to make it
economically and professionally attractive to the attorneys of this State.39
Other state legislatures expressed similar concerns about the existence of
widespread fraud upon consumers. In commenting on Minnesota's consumer fraud
law, its governor noted "the intrastate practice of fraud has grown into a field of
great profit and great damage both to individual citizens and to honest

Florida's Civil Practice & Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.086(2) (LexisNexis 2008)
(rewarding reasonable attorney's fees for a plaintiff who is awarded proceeds in a civil action);
Idaho Code of Civil Procedure Act, IDAHO CODE ANN.

§ 12-117(1) (2008) (awarding

reasonable attorney's fees for any civil action "involving as adverse parties a state agency, a
city, a county, or other taxing district and a person"); The Illinois Nursing Home Care Act,
210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/3-602 (West 2008); New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. STAT.

ANN. § 10:6-2(f) (2008); Oregon Unlawful Discrimination in Employment, Public
Accommodations, and Real Property Transactions Act; Administrative and Civil Enforcement,
OR. REv.

STAT.

ANN. § 659A.885(6)(d)-(e) (2008); Rhode Island Equal Rights of Blind and

Deaf Persons to Public Facilities Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-9.1-3(e) (2008).
36
The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006) "was amended in 1938
to prohibit 'unfair or deceptive acts or practices."' Fed. Trade Comm'n, Appendix 1 - Laws
Enforced by the FTC, http://ftc.gov/opp/gpra/appendl.shtm (quoting Pub. L. No. 447, 52 Stat.
111 (codified as amended at §§ 41-58)).
37
Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 460 460 (N.J. 1994) (quoting S. COMM. B.
No. 199 (1960) (statement to the Senate)).
38
d. at 460 (quoting Governor's Press Release for Assembly Bill No. 2402, at 2 (June 29,
1971)).
39
Skeer v. EMK Motors, Inc., 455 A.2d 508, 513 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1982) (quoting
a letter written by Attorney General Kugler to Senators in 1971, supporting the amendment).
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businessmen. '4' As previously noted, this state of affairs is perhaps even more
pressing today in light of the widespread fraud that homeowners have suffered at the
hands of predatory lenders and predatory mortgage brokers and the public need to
curb such abusive practices is acute. 4 ' The ability of consumers to bring to justice
those who have defrauded them is considered a matter of public interest:
Allowing plaintiffs who successfully pursue an action under the UTPA to
recover their attorney's fees encourages individuals to pursue litigation to
protect the public interest. Similarly, requiring unsuccessful defendants to
pay the plaintiffs attorney's fee discourages tradesmen from engaging in
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts in the conduct
of trade or commerce, thereby also enforcing the purpose of the UTPA.42
In summary, there are five purposes articulated by courts and legislatures for the
prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees in consumer fraud and deceptive
practices statutes: (i) to wholly compensate the victim for her losses; (ii) to punish
the wrongdoer who has engaged in the fraud; (iii) to make it economically feasible
for a consumer to bring a consumer fraud claim, especially when the costs to litigate
it may be higher than the damages to be recovered; (iv) to encourage attorneys to
take on these cases; and (v) to deter future acts of fraud, deception and unfair trade
practices.43
40

Karl F. Rolvaag, Governor, Protecting the Consumer: Special Message to Members of
the Sixty-Third Minnesota Legislative Session, (April. 23, 1963) (transcript available from the
Minnesota Historical Society).
41Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, supra note 23.
42

Taylor v. Medenica, 503 S.E.2d 458, 460 (S.C. 1998).

43

See, e.g., Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 741 A.2d 591, 593 (N.J. 1999) ("The
Consumer Fraud Act has three main purposes: to compensate the victim for his or her actual
loss; to punish the wrongdoer through the award of treble damages .

.

. and by way of the

counsel fee provision, to attract competent counsel to counteract the community scourge of
fraud by providing an incentive for an attorney to take a case involving a minor loss to the
individual.") (citations omitted); Showpiece Homes Corp. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 38 P.3d
47, 50-51 (Colo. 2001) ("The CCPA is a remedial statute intended to deter and punish
deceptive trade practices committed by businesses in dealing with the public .... The CCPA's
broad legislative purpose is 'to provide prompt, economical, and readily available remedies
against consumer fraud' . . . . This purpose is achieved through injunctions and civil penalties
such as treble damages and attorney's fees . . . . The availability of treble damages and
attorney's fees is also intended to promote private enforcement of the CCPA .... The statute

thus provides both for enforcement by the attorney general and a private right of action to any
person injured by the deceptive acts or practices committed by a business." (quoting W. Food
Plan v. Dist. Court (Quinn) 598 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Colo. 1979) (internal citations omitted)));
Sprovach v. Bob Ross Buick, Inc., 628 N.E. 2d 82, 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) ("The object of
R.C. Chapter 1345.09(F) is to provide a remedy to consumers who have been harmed by
unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable sales practices. The object specifically of [the attorney's
fees provision] is to ensure that consumers will be capable of pursuing that remedy. Actions
brought under R.C. Title 13 typically involve relatively small damages, yet the cost of
recovering those damages may be enormous, as the offending suppliers may stoutly defend
themselves just as appellant has done. Confronted with the likelihood of incurring very much
more debt in attorney fees than could be recovered in damages, most consumers would never
bring or continue to prosecute an action for a private remedy." (citing Einhorn v. Ford Motor
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1II. A COMPARISON

OF THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES

Based on our review of the fifty states' consumer fraud and deceptive practices
type statutes, the overwhelming majority, or forty-five 44 states, provide for the
awarding of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff, either as a mandate to the court
or at the discretion of the court. 45 The only state statutes that do not provide for
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff are: Arizona, Delaware, Iowa (which does not
even provide for a private right of action under its consumer fraud statute),
Mississippi, and South Dakota. 46 Among the forty-five states that do provide for the
award of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs, twenty-one of these state statutes
mandate that a court award a prevailing plaintiff her attorney's fees, through the use
of terms like "shall award," and twenty-three permit a court, in the court's discretion,
to award attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff (it is unclear, based on Arkansas
case law, whether awarding fees to a prevailing plaintiff is mandatory or
discretionary so we do not count Arkansas in either the mandatory or discretionary
sub-categories).47
Some states statutes impose other, specific conditions that must be satisfied for a
prevailing plaintiff to be awarded attorney's fees. 8 The Georgia statute provides that
the prevailing plaintiff cannot recover attorney's fees if she rejected a reasonable
written offer of settlement made within thirty days of a written demand for relief, and
case law there also requires that the defendant's actions have the potential to harm
the public.49 Similarly, the North Carolina statute provides that for the prevailing
plaintiff to recover attorney's fees the defendant must have refused to resolve the
matter in an unwarranted fashion." The Hawaii and North Carolina statutes require
that the plaintiff show that the defendant "willfully" engaged in deceptive trade
practices in order for the prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney's fees. 5 Similarly,
the North Dakota statute also requires that the defendant "knowingly" committed the
unlawful act for the prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney's fees.52
In terms of awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendants, only Alaska's
consumer fraud statute on its face mandates that a court should award attorney's fees
Co., 548 N.E.2d 933 (Ohio 1990))); Tanksley v. Cook, 821 A.2d 524, 527 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2003) ("Plaintiff is entitled to recover the fees he was obligated to pay his counsel
for collecting on the judgment. Denial would leave him less than whole and dilute the damage
award intended by the Legislature against fraudulent merchants.").
"Included in the five states that do not provide for a prevailing plaintiffs attorney's fees
is Iowa. Infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix. Iowa currently has a
bill pending that would provide for them.
45See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.
46See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.
47

See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.

48See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.
49See infra the

Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.

50

See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.

51See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.
52

See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.
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to prevailing defendants with no further conditions attached beyond the defendants
prevailing in the litigation. 3 But in reviewing case law interpreting these statutes, we
found that in California the courts have interpreted what appears to be discretionary
language in the statutes for the awarding of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant
to be mandatory.54 In addition, five states' consumer fraud statutes (Alabama,
Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) mandate that a court award
attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant, but only when the plaintiff's case is
deemed one or more of the following: "frivolous," "groundless," "unwarranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law," "for the purpose of harassment," in "bad faith," or in bad faith after a
"reasonable settlement offer" was made (hereafter sometimes collectively referred to
as "frivolous or in bad faith")." A total of twenty-eight states' consumer fraud
statutes either require or permit a prevailing defendant to recover her attorney's
fees. 6 Of those twenty-eight states, twenty clarify (either in the statute or case law
interpreting the statute) that the court should only award attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant if the plaintiffs case is deemed "frivolous or in bad faith."57
However, this leaves eight states (Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky,
Nevada, Oregon, and Rhode Island) whose statutes and court interpretations of these
statutes provide for a court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant at the
court's discretion without any explicit additional requirements, such as the plaintiffs
claim being frivolous or in bad faith. 8
Finally, some state statutes impose other conditions (i.e. in addition to the
frivolous or in bad faith requirements) that must be satisfied for a prevailing
defendant to recover her attorney's fees. The Georgia statute requires that the
plaintiffs action continued after the rejection of a reasonable written offer of
settlement for the prevailing defendant to recover her attorney's fees. Three states
(Hawaii, Kansas, and Utah) require not only that the plaintiffs claim is groundless,
but also that the plaintiff knew that the claim was groundless. The North Carolina
statute similarly requires that the plaintiff knew or should have known the action was
frivolous and malicious. The Oregon statute does not allow attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant in a class action case. However, the Missouri statute, which
permits a court to use its discretion in awarding a prevailing defendant her attorney's
fees, has been interpreted to permit the awarding of attorney's fees to prevailing
defendants not only in the frivolous or bad faith situations, but also if the case
brought was "unreasonable." 59
53

See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.

54

See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.
See Appendix infra (identifying attorney's fees awards for defendants in Alabama,
Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas).
56
See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.
57
See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.
55

58

Id. See Appendix infra (citing Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada,
Oregon, and Rhode Island's consumer protection statutes).
59
Deadwyler v. Volkswagen of Am., 748 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (quoting
Christainburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978)).
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In this Article, we focus on when prevailing parties will or might be able to
recover attorney's fees under the fifty state statutes and case law interpreting these
statutes, rather than on how much of their attorney's fees prevailing plaintiffs or
defendants can recover. The amount of attorney's fees that prevailing plaintiffs can
recover is also an important topic relative to the issue of tailoring the statutory
provisions to promote the five legislative goals articulated earlier, but beyond the
scope of this paper.
The attorney's fees provisions of the fifty states reflect a wide variety of
approaches. The next section provides a preliminary critique of these approaches in
light of the five legislative goals behind enactment of consumer fraud statutes and
raises questions to be empirically tested.
IV. A PRELIMINARY

CRITIQUE AND IDENTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS TO EMPIRICALLY
TEST

An initial critique of the various attorney's fees provisions among the fifty state
consumer fraud statutes should focus on which version of these provisions is best
tailored to achieve the five goals articulated by courts and legislatures in connection
with the enactment of the consumer fraud statutes and the attorney's fees provisions
in such statutes: (i) to wholly compensate the victim for her losses, (ii) to punish the
wrongdoer who has engaged in the fraud, (iii) to make it economically feasible for a
consumer to bring a consumer fraud claim, especially when the costs to litigate it
may be higher than the damages to be recovered, (iv) to encourage attorneys to take
on these cases, and (v) to deter future acts of fraud, deception and unfair trade
practices.6 ° As previously discussed, awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff
has been almost universally considered by state legislatures as essential to the
achievement of these goals.6 Indeed, an overwhelming forty-five states provide for
the possibility of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs under their consumer fraud
acts.
However, twenty-three of the states interject an uncertainty to the recovery of
attorney's fees by prevailing plaintiffs by providing that the awarding of such fees
are within the discretion of the court rather than mandatory. We hypothesized that
attorneys and consumers are less willing (perhaps much less willing) to bring a
consumer fraud case for a plaintiff when they are not assured of recovering their
attorney's fees, even if they prevail in the case. We tested this hypothesis with a
survey of attorneys and consumers discussed in Part V. It is important to note that
even if there is only a small difference in likelihood to take the case due to the
discretionary rather than mandatory language, if there is only a small pool of
attorneys ever willing to take on a typical consumer fraud case on behalf of the
consumer, then even a small difference in willingness to take on a case due to the
discretionary language has a significant impact on the ability of consumers to find
competent attorneys to take on these cases.
There are several reasons why there is only a small pool of attorneys willing to
take on consumer fraud cases on behalf of a consumer. First, there is the economic
feasibility issue discussed in Part II and the need for the awarding of attorney's fees
in order for the attorneys to have an economic incentive to take on the case. Second,
6

°See supra note 41.

6'See

supra Part II.
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even strong and meritorious cases do not always end in victory in court, so attorneys
are not guaranteed to receive any attorney's fees for their work (and some companies
or individuals who defraud consumers may have few assets and are "judgment
proof'). Third, these cases can be difficult to prove and highly complicated,62 which
causes attorneys who do not specialize in this area of law to be reluctant to take on
the case.63 Finally, lawyers at large law firms that tend to represent major business
clients may, due to "firm politics" or potential conflicts of interest, not be able to
represent a consumer in a consumer fraud case against a large company.'M These
factors all contribute to a very small pool of competent attorneys who would
consider taking on a consumer fraud case on behalf of the consumer. Thus, any
further disincentives, such as making the attorney's fees awards discretionary rather
than mandatory, create serious impediments to the goal of encouraging attorneys and
consumers to bring these cases and cause the impact of badly worded attorney's fees
provisions to become even more significant.
We were also interested in testing the impact of the strength of the case on the
willingness of attorneys to take on the case. We hypothesized that when the
consumer fraud case is less strong, but in good faith, such as a situation where it is
difficult to prove the alleged facts or when the plaintiff argues for a new
interpretation of the statute based on policy grounds or case law in other
jurisdictions, that attorneys are even less likely to take on the case due to the reduced
chances of recovering their attorney's fees. We test this hypothesis in the study of
consumers and attorneys described in Part V. There were other variations among the
statutes regarding the plaintiffs recovery of her attorney's fees, but the variations
were either idiosyncratic or involved so few states that we elected not to empirically
test the impact of these variations.65
Although the most fundamental of the five legislative goals is to enable and
encourage consumers and attorneys to bring cases against businesses that defrauded
the consumer, some of the other legislative goals are also impeded when a court in
its discretion chooses not to award attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff. One of
these other legislative goals is to wholly compensate the victim of fraud from her
62

See supra note 28.

63

This information comes from a conversation author Debra Pogrund Stark, Professor of
Law at The John Marshall Law School, had with her colleagues who were asked to participate
in the survey. The conversation raised this point, as did a conversation with alumni who teach
at the law school and handle specialized areas of law.
64E-mail from one of the attorneys contacted to complete the survey, to Debra Pogrund
Stark, Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law School (Jan. 29, 2008, 06:15:08 CST) (on
file with author).
65
As noted in Part III, a handful of states require that the defendant's false statement be
"willful" or "knowing" but many state statutes already require that the false statement be
willful or knowing for the plaintiff to recover any damages. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 646.605 (2008) (willful); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §37-24-6(1) (2008) (knowingly and

intentionally); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-4(2) (2008) (knowingly or intentionally); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 40-12-105(a) (2008) (knowingly). In addition, two states require also that the
plaintiff had not rejected a "reasonable" settlement in order to obtain attorney's fees from the
defendant. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(d) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-16.1(1) (West
2008).
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losses. But this clearly does not occur when a court in its discretion chooses not to
award attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff. Indeed the consumer may end up with
no recovery at all if the attorney's fees equal or exceed the consumer's actual
damages. Another goal that is impeded with a discretionary award of attorney's fees
is having the wrongdoers who have engaged in fraud be punished. Having the
wrongdoer pay the consumer's damages and the consumer's attorney fees forces the
wrongdoer to not only give back what she defrauded from the consumer but also pay
another sum as well.66 If there are no attorney's fees awarded, the wrongdoer is not
really punished for her actions, unless the court has awarded punitive damages.
Another articulated legislative goal is to deter future fraud. We speculate that when
a business is aware that they might be liable not only to return their ill gotten gains,
but also to pay the consumer's attorney's fees, this is an added deterrent to
committing the fraud.67 If businesses know that even if they lose in the consumer
fraud case a court might not award the plaintiff her attorney's fees, the wrongdoer
calculates this uncertainty of having to pay those fees, and the reduced chance the
consumer will now bring a claim, in determining whether to engage in the fraud.68
How do awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant comport with the five
legislative goals and why do some legislatures provide for attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant in a consumer fraud case?
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Krautsack v. Anderson,69 addressed this issue
when called upon to determine how to interpret a consumer fraud statute that
provides for the court in its discretion to award attorney's fees to a prevailing
plaintiff or prevailing defendant. Similar to how the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
a similar issue in a Title VII case,7" the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the policies
that support a prevailing defendant recovering attorney's fees are different from, and
much more limited than, for a prevailing plaintiff.71 The Illinois Supreme Court
noted two legislative policies that would explain awarding attorney's fees in a

66However,

some statutes provide for punitive damages that also promote this goal. See,

e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a)(4) (Deering 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-11 Og(a)
(West 2007); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(C) (LexisNexis 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1399 (2008); IDAHO CODE § 48-608(2) (2008); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 367.220(1) (LexisNexis
2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.025 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.638(1) (West

2008); R.I.

GEN. LAWS

§ 6-13.1-5.2 (2008). Further, where the statute itself does not allow

punitives, con*sumers may still recover "punitive-like" damages. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS

ch. 93A, § 1 (LexisNexis 2008); McEvoy Travel Bureau v. Norton Co. 563 N.E.2d 188, 196
(Mass. 1990) (stating that section 11 does not authorize punitives, but allows "multiple
damages ... [which] are essentially punitive in nature").
67

Although, again, in states that award punitive damages, see supra note 64, such award
should also accomplish the goal of deterrence.
68
We have not tried to empirically test this hypothesis, but applying a cost/benefit analysis
to engaging in fraud, assuming that unscrupulous businesses are rational decision makers,
would lead to this conclusion. Testing this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper.
69861 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. 2006)
70
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412
(1978).
71
Krautsack, 861 N.E.2d at 645-47.
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consumer fraud statute claim to a prevailing defendant: "to deter bad faith conduct
by a plaintiff and to reimburse a defendant when that occurs."72 The court also noted
that limiting the circumstances of when a prevailing defendant can recover attorney's
fees when a plaintiff has brought a consumer fraud act claim is consistent with the
overall goals of the consumer fraud act because to interpret the circumstances in a
broader way would have a chilling effect on the goal of encouraging consumers to
bring good faith, legitimate claims:
Limiting a consumer fraud defendant's ability to recover fees to
instances where the plaintiff acted in bad faith is consistent with the
purpose of the Act. If this limitation did not exist, a prevailing defendant
could be awarded fees simply because the plaintiff, although having a
legitimate claim and proceeding in good faith, lost at trial on the proofs.
The potential for such a penalty would act as a deterrent to the filing of
valid consumer fraud claims. Our duty, of course, is to avoid a
construction that would defeat the statute's purpose or yield absurd or
unjust results.73
The court in Krautsack ruled that in light of the entire consumer fraud statute and
the purpose of the statute (to encourage and enable consumers to bring a consumer
fraud claim), the court interpreted the statute to require that, as a "threshold" matter,
the defendant first must show that a plaintiff has acted in "bad faith" before a court
could in its discretion (applying any other relevant factors) award a prevailing
defendant attorney's fees.74 The court noted that case law on what is conduct that a
court can sanction under Supreme Court Rule 137 is relevant to a court's
determination of what is "bad faith" under a consumer fraud claim.75 However, the
court ruled that the standard for what is "bad faith" in the consumer fraud claim
context is not limited to the narrow definition in Supreme Court Rule 137, which
only addresses the pleadings, motions and other papers a litigant files, since a litigant
or the litigant's attorney can engage in bad faith conduct at other times during the
course of litigation as well.76
Not every jurisdiction faced with a similar consumer fraud provision on
attorney's fees will necessarily follow this ruling. Although the Illinois Supreme
Court's policy analysis is quite strong, as the dissenting justice points out, the
72

Id.at 646 (citing Haskell v. Blumthal, 204 Ill. App. 3d 596, 602 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)).

73Id.

(citations omitted).

74

1d. at 647. Among the other factors that Illinois courts had considered in deciding
whether to award damages to a prevailing defendant were:
[1] the ability of the opposing party to satisfy an award of fees; [2] whether an award
of fees against the opposing party would deter others from acting under similar
circumstances; [3] whether the party requesting fees sought to benefit all consumers or
businesses or to resolve a significant legal question regarding the Act; and [4] the
relative merits of the parties' positions.
Id. at 644 (quoting Graunke Chrysler Plymouth Volvo, 617 N.E.2d 858, 863-64 (I11.
App. Ct.
1993)).
75
Krautsack, 861 N.E.2d at 644.
76
1d. at 648 (citing In re Marriage of Oleksy, 787 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2003)).
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majority's interpretation of the statute can be criticized as doing more than
interpreting the statute. By requiring a threshold finding of bad faith by the plaintiff,
the court is adding a requirement that is not in the statute and is thus "amending" the
statute.77 "Although the majority makes a persuasive case as to why section 10a(c)
should require a prevailing defendant to demonstrate that the plaintiff acted in bad
faith, the legislature chose not to include such a requirement, and it is not the
prerogative of this court to correct the legislature's omissions."" Thus, in
jurisdictions where the consumer fraud statute provides that the prevailing defendant
can recover attorney's fees at the discretion of the court, it is possible, but uncertain,
that a court will confine this discretion to bad faith acts; some might agree with the
dissent in Krautsack and refuse to so interpret the statute because they view it as
"amending" the statute. Until the supreme courts of each of these states rules on
how this discretion is to be exercised, lower state courts (and federal courts applying
state law) could opt to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant on much lesser
grounds than a showing of bad faith by the plaintiff. But what could these lesser
grounds be?
The U.S. Supreme Court in ChristiansburgGarment Co. v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission79 addressed the issue of how to interpret a statute which
provides for attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff or defendant at the court's
discretion. Although the case involved a Title VII employment discrimination claim,
and thus, the ruling is not binding on courts interpreting state consumer fraud
statutes, due to the similarity between Title VII and consumer fraud statutes (both
seek to eradicate the bad behavior prohibited under each of their statutes through the
awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff), the Christiansburgdecision
provides guidance to state and federal courts on how to interpret the discretionary
language in the consumer fraud statutes. Indeed, some courts have already applied
the reasoning in that case in interpreting the discretionary attorney's fees language in
the consumer fraud statute. 0
In determining how to interpret language which permitted a court in its discretion
to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII claim, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Christiansburgfirst addressed the question of what policy goals
are achieved through awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendants. 1 The Court
noted that the language in the statute did not provide any guidance to it on how the
Court should exercise this discretion.82 The Court immediately thereafter, however,
stated, "a moment's reflection reveals that there are at least two strong equitable
considerations counseling an attorney's fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff
77

1d. at 651 (Karneier, J., dissenting).
Id. at 652 (citing In re Marriage of Murphy, 786 N.E.2d 132 (I1. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
78

79434 U.S. 412 (1978).
80

See, e.g., Deadwyler v. Volkswagen of Am., 748 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (W.D.N.C. 1990);
Morris-Smith v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (C.D. Cal. 1999);
Akin v. Cabrera & Rephen, Prof I Corp., No. CIV-00-158L, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24265, at
*5 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 24, 2001).
81
Christiansburg,434 U.S. at 413.
82

1d. at 418.
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that are wholly absent in the case of a prevailing Title VII defendant."83 First, that
through bringing a case of employment discrimination, the plaintiff is the "chosen
instrument of Congress to vindicate 'a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority."' 84 Second, when a court awards attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff, "it
is awarding them against a violator of federal law."85 A prevailing defendant seeking
attorney's fees must rely on different equitable considerations.86
The Court in Christiansburgrejected the plaintiffs contention that the prevailing
defendant should only be awarded attorney's fees when the plaintiffs case is brought
in bad faith, because the Court concluded that even under the common law rule,
attorney's fees already may be awarded against a party who has proceeded in bad
faith.87 The Court then looked to the legislative history on attorney's fees under Title
II (since they found none under Title VII) and noted that several senators explained
that its allowance of awards to defendants was for the purpose "to deter the bringing
of lawsuits without foundation," to "discourage frivolous suits," and to "diminish the
likelihood of unjustified suits being brought."88 Consequently, the Court also rejected
the defendant's claim that he should be awarded attorney's fees when he prevails
unless special circumstances exist. Instead, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs claim
must be "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to
litigate after it clearly became so" for a court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing
defendant in a Title VII case.89 The Court also ruled that "if a plaintiff is found to
have brought or continued such a claim in bad faith, there will be an even stronger
basis for charging him with the attorney's fees incurred by the defense." ' Of equal
importance in terms of providing guidance to courts on what it means to bring a
"frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless" case, the court clarified that "when the law
or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an
entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit."'" The Court affirmed the lower court's
holding that the bringing of a case of first impression did not cause the action to be
"unreasonable or merit less" for purposes of awarding attorney's fees to the
prevailing defendant.92
The test the U.S. Supreme Court adopted in Christiansburg,awarding attorney's
fees to a prevailing defendant only when the plaintiff's case is deemed "frivolous,
unreasonable or groundless," is the standard that many state legislatures enacted
83

1d

84d. (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
85
1d. at 418.
Id.at 419.
87

1d.

88

1d. at

420 (quoting remarks of Senators Lausche, Pastore, and Humphrey, respectively

110 CONG. REc. 12724, 13668, 14214 (1964)).
89

1d. at 422.

90

1d.

91

1d.

at 423-24 (quoting EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment, Co., No. 74-18, 1975 WL 317,
at *1 (W.D. Va. July 28, 1975)).
92Id.
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expressly. Of the twenty state consumer fraud statutes that permit a court to award
attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant, fifteen of those states expressly clarify in
the legislation, or in court interpretations of the legislation, that courts should only
award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant when the plaintiff's case is frivolous
or brought in bad faith.93 However, five states' consumer fraud statutes (Florida,
Indiana, Kentucky, Oregon, and Rhode Island) provide for attorney's fees to
prevailing defendants without this clarifying condition, and published case law in
those states have not yet clarified that the discretion is subject to this condition. In
addition to the twenty states' consumer fraud statutes that permit a court to award
attorney's fees to prevailing defendants, five additional states mandate that a court do
so, but only if the plaintiffs case is deemed frivolous or in bad faith.94
We hypothesized that in the five states where the consumer fraud act permits a
court in its discretion to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant without
clarifying that this should only occur if the plaintiff's case is frivolous or brought in
bad faith and in the one state, Georgia, that mandates that the prevailing defendant is
awarded attorney's fees, the consumer and attorney are less likely to bring a
legitimate fraud claim, even a strong one. We tested this hypothesis through a
survey of consumers and attorneys described in Part V below. We also wondered
what impact the frivolous standard might have in the bringing of good faith claims
that are much less certain of success because the claim is based upon a policy
argument seeking an extension or modification of case law interpreting the statute.
We also sought to test if the frivolous standard for awarding attorney's fees to
prevailing defendants deters the filing of bad faith claims, without deterring a good
faith claim that is less certain of success. The surveys we constructed and the results
of these surveys are described in Part V below.
V. EMPIRICALLY TESTING CONSUMER AND ATTORNEY RESPONSES

We surveyed consumers and attorneys on their willingness to bring consumer
fraud cases against an insurance company under three scenarios. In all three
scenarios, we asked consumers to imagine that they believed that they had been
defrauded by their insurance company, and we asked attorneys to imagine that they
had been approached by a consumer who believed that she had been defrauded by
her insurance company. In all three scenarios, the attorney's fees to fight the case in
court were likely to exceed the amount of the consumer's damages. The survey told
the attorneys that the client did not want to pay the attorney any legal fees unless the
fees came from her recovery against the insurance company. The first scenario was
a clear case of fraud wherein the consumer had a very good chance of winning if she
brought the case. We call this scenario the "likely to win" scenario.
The second scenario was less clear. If the court were to adopt a new
interpretation of the consumer fraud act based upon a policy argument accepted by
some courts in other states, but that had not yet been raised in her state, then she
should win the case. It was uncertain, however, if the court would accept this policy
argument as the basis to rule in their favor. We call this scenario the "good faith
extension" scenario.
93

See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.

94

See infra the Attorney's Fees Summary, located in the Appendix.
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The third was a scenario wherein she would ultimately lose the case because
there was no valid cause of action under the law. There was a chance, however, that
she might persuade the insurance company to settle the case, as the insurance
company would want to avoid the time and attorney's fees in trying the case and the
costs of an appeal in case a jury was to find against the defendant and perhaps even
award punitive damages. We call this scenario the "bad faith" scenario.
Participants rated their willingness to bring the consumer fraud case in each of
these three scenarios under four consumer fraud statutory versions:
Statutory Version 1. The consumer fraud act permits a court in its discretion to
award attorney's fees to either the prevailing plaintiff or a prevailing defendant.
Statutory Version 2. The consumer fraud act permits a court in its discretion to
award attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff, but not to a prevailing defendant,
unless the defendant can show that the case was frivolous.
Statutory Version 3. The consumer fraud act requires a court to award attorney's
fees to the prevailing plaintiff, but not to a prevailing defendant, unless the defendant
can show that the case was frivolous.
Statutory Version 4. The consumer fraud act requires a court to award attorney's
fees to the prevailing plaintiff, but not to a prevailing defendant.
Because Statutory Versions 3 and 4 made bringing a case more certain of
recovery of attorneys' fees and therefore, more economically feasible, one might
predict that more participants would be willing to bring cases under Statutory
Versions 3 and 4 than under Statutory Versions 1 and 2. Since the case in the "likely
to win" scenario would clearly not be frivolous, one might predict that a policy
allowing the awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant only when cases
are ruled frivolous would have no effect on a participant's willingness to bring the
case in the "likely to win" scenario. This reasoning suggests that in the "likely to
win" scenario participants should have been just as, likely to bring the case under
Statutory Version 3 as under Statutory Version 4. However, we feared that any
policy that allows the awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant, even
one that limits the awarding of attorney's fees to those cases that are ruled frivolous,
might have a chilling effect on people's willingness to bring even strong consumer
fraud cases. If so, then participants in the "likely to win" scenario should have been
less likely to bring the case under Statutory Version 3 than under Statutory Version
4.
We also wanted to investigate whether a policy of allowing the awarding of
attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant when cases are ruled frivolous is
necessary to discourage people from bringing the case in the "bad faith" scenario. If
in the "bad faith" scenario people were particularly likely to bring the case under
Statutory Version 4, but not under Statutory Version 3, this finding would suggest
that allowing the awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant when cases
are ruled frivolous is necessary to discourage "bad faith" cases. However, doing so
might have a chilling effect on "good faith extension" cases which for policy reasons
one might want to encourage. We, therefore, wanted to investigate how a policy that
allows the awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant only when cases
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are ruled frivolous would affect the participants' willingness to bring "good faith
extension" cases.
Study 1: Survey of Consumers
Study 1 queried consumers on the likelihood that they would bring consumer
fraud cases in each of the three scenarios described above. Although consumers
often have difficulties bringing cases on their own without the aid of attorneys, cases
would not be brought to court without consumers. The likelihood that they would
seek the aid of an attorney to bring cases under each statutory version is the first step
in determining which cases are brought to court.
Method
Participants. Three hundred fifty-four consumers, none of whom were law
students or lawyers, volunteered to participate after law students approached them
and asked them to participate. Eighty of these participants rated their willingness to
bring cases under Statutory Version 1; 78 rated their willingness to bring cases under
Statutory Version 2; 99 rated their willingness under Statutory Version 3; and 97
rated their willingness under Statutory Version 4.
Method and Procedure. Consumers were first asked about their willingness to
bring the case under the "likely to win" scenario. They were instructed to imagine
that they felt that they had been cheated by their insurance company and that their
attorney told them that they had a very good chance of winning a case against the
insurance company under the state's consumer fraud act, but that is was likely that it
would cost them more in attorney's fees to fight the case in court than the amount
that they had been damaged by the insurance company. They then were asked to rate
their willingness to hire the attorney to take on the case in this "likely to win"
scenario assuming that the attorney's fees provisions of their state's consumer fraud
act read as either Statutory Version 1, 2, 3, or 4. We were concerned that the
descriptions of these statutory versions presented above might have had too much
legal jargon for lay people, so we rephrased these four versions asking these
consumers to assume one of the following:
Statutory Version 1. Assume that under the consumer fraud act, if you win the
court might, but is not required to, order the insurance company to pay you back
what you spent on attorney's fees; while if you lose the court might, but is not
required to, force you to pay the insurance company's attorney's fees.
Statutory Version 2. Assume that under the consumer fraud act, if you win the
court might, but is not required to, order the insurance company to pay you back
what you spent on attorney's fees. Also assume that if you lose the court can only
force you to pay the insurance company's attorney's fees if the insurance company
shows that your case was frivolous.
Statutory Version 3. Assume that under the consumer fraud act, if you win the
court is required to order the insurance company to pay you back what you spent on
attorney's fees. Also assume that if you lose the court can only force you to pay the
insurance company's attorney's fees if the insurance company shows that your case
was frivolous.
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Statutory Version 4. Assume that under the consumer fraud act, if you win the
court is required to order the insurance company to pay you back what you spent on
attorney's fees.
Those consumers who received Statutory Versions 2 or 3 were assured that their
attorneys had advised them that their case in this "likely to win" scenario was not
frivolous. So they should have felt safe to bring the case since they presumably
would never have to pay the insurance company's attorney's fees. Consumers then
rated their willingness to hire the attorney to take on the case on a 5-point scale,
where 1 represented that they were "highly unwilling to hire the attorney to bring the
case" and 5 represented that they were "highly willing to hire the attorney to bring
the case."
Next, these consumers were asked about their willingness to bring the case under
the "good faith extension" scenario. They were again instructed to imagine that they
felt that they had been cheated by their insurance company, but this time their
attorney told them that it was unclear whether they would win or lose the case
against the insurance company under the state's consumer fraud act. Their attorney
told them that if the court were to adopt a new interpretation of the consumer fraud
act based upon a policy argument that their attorney would raise then they should
win the case. This policy argument had been accepted by some courts in other states
but it had not yet been raised in their state and it was uncertain whether the court
would accept this policy argument as the basis to rule in their favor. They then rated
their willingness to hire the attorney to bring the case under the same statutory
version that they had assumed for the "likely to win" scenario.
Finally, these consumers were asked about their willingness to bring the case
under the "bad faith" scenario. Their attorney told them that they would ultimately
lose the case under the state's consumer fraud statute once the case had made its way
through the court system. Although a jury might be sympathetic to their situation, on
appeal a judge would ultimately rule that the insurance company could do what it
did. There was a chance, however, that they might be able to persuade the insurance
company to settle the case after their attorney brought a lawsuit, because the
insurance company would want to avoid the time and attorney's fees in trying the
case. The survey also told the consumer that the insurance company might also want
to settle because it might fear that a jury could misapply the law and rule against the
insurance company, requiring the company to pay damages and possibly even triple
the amount of the damages as a penalty. Additionally, even though the insurance
company on appeal should still win the case, causing the jury verdict to be overturned and ineffective, the insurance company would still have had to hire an
attorney to work on that appeal, which might cause them to agree to settle the case.
They then rated their willingness to bring the case under the same statutory version
that they had assumed for the "likely to win" and "good faith extension" scenarios.
Results
The results of Study 1: Survey of Consumers is shown in Figure 1. There was a
statistically significant effect of the scenario on a consumer's willingness to bring a
consumer fraud case against the insurance company such that consumers were
statistically more likely to bring a case in the "likely to win" scenario than in the
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"good faith extension" scenario and more likely to bring a case in the "good faith
extension" scenario than in the "bad faith" scenario.95 There was also a statistically
significant interaction between the statute version and the scenario.96 The interaction
was such that in the "likely to win" scenario, but not the "good faith extension" or
the "bad faith" scenarios, Statutory Version 4 made consumers statistically more
likely to bring cases than Statutory Versions 1 and 2. By contrast, in the "bad faith"
and "good faith extension" scenarios, none of the apparent differences in likelihood
to bring a case shown in Figure 1 reached statistical significance. These findings
suggest that Statutory Version 4 is likely to encourage meritorious consumer fraud
cases that are based upon established precedent without unduly encouraging bad
faith cases. Conversely, these findings suggest that Statutory Versions 1, 2 and 3 are
likely to discourage the bringing of meritorious consumer fraud cases.
Unfortunately, Statute Version 4 is not likely to be as effective in encouraging good
faith extensions of precedent by consumers. However, Study 2 of attorneys, infra,
found that attorneys were statistically more likely to take on a good faith extension
case under Statutory Version 4 than under the other statutory versions.
Figure 1. Results of Study 1, survey of consumers: Although consumers were
more likely to want to bring bad faith cases than attorneys (see Study 2 and Figure
2), the apparent effects of the statutory version failed to reach statistical significance
in the "bad faith" scenario (third panel).
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results were analyzed using a 3 (scenario: "likely to win," "good faith extension,"
"bad faith") x 4 (statutory version: dual discretionary, discretionary/frivolous, required
frivolous, required plaintiff only) mixed factors analysis of variance. The main effect of
scenario was highly significant, F(2,700)=283.16, MSE=0.61, p<.Ol. All of the simple effects
presented here were analyzed using Fischer's Least Significant Difference tests. All p's<.05.
96
F(2,700)=2.92, MSE=0.61, p<.O.
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Study 2: Survey of Attorneys
Study 2 queried attorneys on the likelihood that they would take consumer fraud
cases in the "likely to win," "bad faith," and "good faith extension" scenarios
described above. Unlike the survey of consumers (Study 1) wherein each participant
was only asked about the likelihood that she would bring cases under one of the four
statutory versions, this survey questioned attorneys on their willingness to take cases
under all four statutory versions: Statute Versions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Although
consumers might want to bring cases to court, they will often have difficulty without
the aid of an attorney. The likelihood that attorneys will accept cases is, therefore,
often a necessary step in determining which cases are brought to court.
Method
Participants. One hundred thirty three attorneys volunteered to participate after
being recruited from Chicago-area law firms, the John Marshall Law School alumni
listserv, and the John Marshall Law School faculty.
Method and Procedure. Attorneys were first asked about their willingness to take
the case under the "likely to win" scenario. They were instructed to assume that they
had an active general litigation practice with no conflict of interest in representing a
consumer in a lawsuit against an insurance company. A potential client met with
them to seek their representation of her. She told them of how she was defrauded by
her insurance company, and they determined that they would have a very good
chance of winning the case under the state's consumer fraud act, but that it was
likely that it would cost more to litigate the case than the amount that she had been
damaged by her insurance company. They were also instructed to assume that the
client did not want to pay them any legal fees unless the fees came from her recovery
against the insurance company. They then were instructed to rate their willingness to
take on the case in this "likely to win" scenario on a 5-point scale, where I
represented that they were "highly unwilling to take on the case" and 5 represented
that they were "highly willing to take on the case" under Statutory Version 1, then
Statutory Version 2, then Statutory Version 3, and then Statutory Version 4.
Attorneys were next asked about their willingness to take the case in the "bad
faith" scenario. In this scenario, they were instructed to imagine that they
determined that they would ultimately lose the case if it were litigated because they
had no valid cause of action under the law. The only way that they could recover
anything from the insurance company would be by bringing the lawsuit in the hope
that the insurance company would settle the case as a means to avoid the time and
expense of litigation. In calculating this time and expense, the insurance company
might also have factored in the possibility that a jury would misapply the law and
even award punitive damages, requiring the insurance company to pay for an appeal
of the case. Attorneys then rated their willingness to take on the case in this "bad
faith" scenario under each of the four statutory versions.
Finally, attorneys were asked about their willingness to take the case in the "good
faith extension" scenario. In this scenario, they were instructed to imagine that they
determined that it was unclear whether they would win or lose the case. They
determined that if the court were to adopt a new interpretation of the consumer fraud
act based upon a policy argument that they would raise then they should win the
case. This policy argument had been accepted by some courts in other states, but it
had not been raised in their state and it was uncertain whether the court would accept
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this policy argument as the basis to rule in their client's favor. They then rated their
willingness to take on the case in this "good faith extension" scenario under each of
the four statutory versions.
Results
The results of Study 2, Survey of Attorneys, are shown in Figure 2. As in the
Survey of Consumers, there was a statistically significant effect of the scenario on
attorneys' willingness to take consumer fraud cases against the insurance companies,
such that attorneys were statistically more likely to bring a case in the "likely to win"
scenario than in the "good faith extension" scenario and more likely to bring a case
in the "good faith extension" scenario than in the "bad faith" scenario97 There was
also a statistically significant interaction between the statute version and the
scenario.98 The interaction was such that in the "likely to win" and "good faith
extension" scenarios, all of the apparent effects of statutory version reached
statistical significance. That is, Statutory Version 2 was statistically greater than
Statutory Version 1 (i.e. attorneys were statistically more willing to take the case in
Statutory Version 2 than in Statutory Version 1), Statutory Version 3 was statistically
greater than Statutory Versions 1 and 2 (i.e. attorneys were statistically more willing
to take the case in Statutory Version 3 than in Statutory Versions 1 and 2), and
Statutory Version 4 was statistically greater than Statutory Versions 1, 2, and 3 (i.e.
attorneys were statistically more willing to take the case in Statutory Version 4 than
in Statutory Versions 1, 2, or 3). By contrast, in the "bad faith" scenario, only
Statutory Version 4 was statistically greater than the other statutory versions. That
is, in the "bad faith" scenario attorneys were statistically more willing to take the
case in Statutory Version 4 than in Statutory Versions 1, 2, or 3. Although Statutory
Version 4 is statistically more likely to encourage bad faith cases than the other
statutory versions, attorneys rated themselves very unlikely to take these "bad faith"
cases. Even under statutory Version 4, the average rating was 1.23 on a scale from 1
to 5, where 1 represented that they were "highly unwilling to take on the case."
Figure 2. Results of Study 2, survey of attorneys: Attorneys were much less
likely to take on cases in the "bad faith" scenario than in the "likely to win" or "good
faith extension" scenarios.

97

These results were analyzed using a 3 (scenario: "likely to win," "good faith extension,"
"bad faith") x 4 (statutory version: dual discretionary, discretionary/frivolous, required
frivolous, required plaintiff only) within-subjects analysis of variance. The main effect of
scenario was highly significant, F(2,264)=393.02, MSE=l.99, p<.Ol. All of the simple effects
presented here were analyzed using Fischer's Least Significant Difference tests. All p's<.05.
9

'F(6,792)=54.50, MSE=0.2 1, p<.01.
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VI. PROPOSED REFORM IN LIGHT OF LEGISLATIVE GOALS AND EMPIRICAL DATA

Based upon the results of our surveys and the goals of the consumer fraud
statutes, including the goal of encouraging legitimate, good faith, consumer claims
and discouraging, bad-faith or frivolous claims, we recommend that the best
approach among the four versions of attorney's fees provisions is that taken by the
ten states that require the prevailing plaintiff be awarded attorney's fees with no
special additional rule for the prevailing defendant to recover attorney's fees (i.e.
relying instead upon Rule 11 type sanctions for bad-faith/frivolous actions that
generally exist under federal or state rules of civil procedure). This conclusion is
best represented by Statutory Version 4 in our survey, which is followed by
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, South
Carolina, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
The results from the attorney surveys make clear that in the context of the "likely
to win" scenario, attorneys are in fact, statistically more likely to bring this type of
meritorious case under the Version 4 of attorney's fees than under Statutory Versions
1, 2, and even 3. Under Statutory Version 1 (attorney's fees to be awarded to the
prevailing party at the court's discretion) attorneys rated a willingness of only 2.79
on a 5 point scale to take on a case where their defrauded client was likely to
succeed. That figure goes up to 4.08 under Statutory Version 4, where the court is
required to award the prevailing plaintiff her attorney's fees. There is a similar,
though less dramatic, impact on the willingness to bring a case based on the version
of the attorney's fees provisions in the context of a "good faith extension" of the law
case, with attorneys being statistically more likely to bring this type of case under
Statutory Version 4 than under Statutory Versions 1, 2, and 3. It is obvious that
legislatures wish to encourage the bringing of consumer fraud cases where the
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consumer's case is so strong that an attorney determines that if the case is brought
the consumer is very likely to win. "Good faith extension" cases, however, are also
ones that legislatures would wish to encourage as well, since such a case, if
successful, can set a precedent that will assist the general consumer public in the
future.
Even though the overriding intent of state legislatures in providing for attorney's
fees in the consumer fraud statutes was to achieve the five goals enumerated earlier,
it is also a secondary legislative goal in general to discourage the bringing of bad
faith or frivolous cases. We, thus, explored how the four versions of attorney's fees
provisions impacted attorneys' willingness to take on a "bad faith" case (one where
the attorney knows she will ultimately lose the case if tried but is bringing the case to
try to induce a settlement). We did find that attorneys were statistically more likely
to bring a bad faith claim under Statutory Version 4 than under Statutory Versions 1,
2 or 3. However, it is important to note the extremely low level of willingness by
attorneys to take on a bad faith claim under any of these four versions of attorney's
fees. Even under Statutory Version 4, attorneys rated themselves on a scale from 1
to 5 an average of only 1.23 willing to take on the "bad faith" claim (contrast this
with the 4.08 for a "likely to win" scenario and the 2.93 for the "good faith
extension" claim). Because attorneys expressed such a strong unwillingness to take
on the bad faith type claim even under Statutory Version 4, it appears that the
possible imposition of fees under the statute to a prevailing defendant for a frivolous
claim is not necessary to dissuade attorneys from taking on bad faith claims (perhaps
because of the ethical rules and rules of civil procedure that already exist regarding
taking on frivolous claims).
Since Statutory Version 4 is necessary to encourage the widest pool of attorneys
to take on a legitimate consumer fraud case and so few attorneys are willing to take
on a bad faith case even under Statutory Version 4, we conclude that Statutory
Version 4 best meets all of the legislative goals regarding consumer fraud statutes.
Indeed, the results from our studies could apply to any other statute enacted by
Congress or the states, where the legislature is similarly trying to encourage the
bringing of lawsuits to combat a problem of public concern (such as antidiscrimination laws) as its primary goal but at the same time not wanting to
encourage frivolous or bad faith claims as a general, secondary goal.
Statutory Version 3 (which eight states currently follow: Alabama, California,
Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) is the next best
approach to awarding attorney's fees, since it discourages the most bad faith filings
by attorneys (attorneys rated themselves only 1.06 willing to take on a bad faith
claim which was not significantly different from Statutory Versions 1 and 2 but was
lower than under Statutory Version 4). Furthermore, after Statutory Version 4,
Statutory Version 3 is most likely to encourage attorneys to take on a "likely to win"
case or a "good faith extension" case (although still statistically significantly less
likely to encourage such cases than Statutory Version 4). Statutory Version 2 (which
twelve states currently follow: Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri,
Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia) is the
next best approach (under which attorneys rated themselves 3.26 willing to take on a
"likely to win" case, 2.47 willing to take on a "good faith extension" case, and 1.06
willing to take on a "bad faith case), followed by Statutory Version 1 (which five
states currently follow: Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, and Rhode Island),
which is the worst approach to encouraging the bringing of legitimate consumer
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fraud claims (attorneys under Statutory Version 1 rated themselves only 2.79 willing
to take on a "likely to win" case, 2.13 willing to take on a "good faith extension
case," and 1.11 willing to take on a "bad faith" case). 99
The results from the consumer survey provide even greater support for applying
Statutory Version 4. Our results indicated that consumers' willingness to bring "bad
faith" cases was not affected by the statute version to a statistically significant
degree. Thus, Statutory Version 4 does not make consumers statistically more likely
to bring a "bad faith" claim than under Statutory Versions 1, 2, and 3. Similar to the
results from the attorney surveys in the "likely to win" scenario, consumers were
statistically more willing to bring a case under Statutory Version 4, than under
Statutory Versions 1 or 2. However, under the consumer survey in the context of a
"good faith extension" case, the differences among the four versions of attorney's
fees provisions do not reach statistical significance. 0 Although consumers reported
a willingness of 3.52 under Statutory Version 4 and a willingness of only 3.36 under
Statutory Version 3, this difference is not statistically significant. Although, these
results also indicate that Statutory Version 4 was not more likely than Statutory
Versions 1, 2, and 3 to encourage consumers to bring "good faith extension" cases,
Statutory Version 4 made attorneys statistically more willing to bring "good faith
extension" cases than under Statutory Versions 1, 2, and 3.
VII. CONCLUSION
Does engaging in fraud "pay" for unscrupulous businesses due to the fact that
consumers and their attorneys are unlikely in a typical consumer fraud situation to
bring a case against the company for fraud?"0 1 Although forty-five states try to
address the economic feasibility problem with bringing a typical consumer fraud
case by providing for attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff, our survey of
consumers shows that when the consumer fraud statutes award attorney's fees to the
prevailing plaintiff at the court's discretion, consumers rated themselves as
statistically less willing to bring a "strong meritorious" claim than when the statute
mandated for the awarding of such fees only to the prevailing plaintiff.0 2 Our survey
of attorneys reflected that attorneys rated themselves as statistically less willing to

"The four versions only add up to thirty-five states because, of the forty-five states that
provide for attorney's fees, ten states vary somewhat from these four versions and in several
cases lead to situations where only one or two states could be grouped together in terms of
combination of approaches. The largest of these groups involved six states (Connecticut,
Maine, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia) that provided for attorney's fees to
a prevailing plaintiff at the court's discretion and no fees to a prevailing defendant.
1000ne explanation for why consumers were less likely to bring a frivolous claim under
Statutory Versions 2 and 3 (which talk about paying the defendant's fees if the claim they file
is frivolous) than under Versions 1 and 4 (which do not talk about this) is that lawyers already
know that they and their client could be sanctioned for bringing a frivolous claim, while
consumers are not as likely to know that.
1""There are many additional reasons why so few consumers and attorneys are willing to
bring meritorious fraud claims. See supra discussion in Part II and accompanying notes.
However, this article has focused only on the economic feasibility issue.
2

10

See supra Part V.
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bring both a "strong meritorious claim" and a "good faith extension of the law"
claim when the attorney's fees provision was discretionary rather than mandatory." 3
Currently, twenty-three states' statutes merely permit (or have been interpreted to
permit), rather than mandate, a court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing
plaintiff."' Based upon our survey of consumers and attorneys, it is clear that the
laws in these states impede the legislative goals of encouraging meritorious claims to
make consumers whole and of deterring and punishing consumer fraud.
Furthermore, we have seen no countervailing legislative policy that would explain
why a court should, in its discretion, elect not to award attorney's fees to a prevailing
consumer. We, thus, urge these twenty-three states (Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia) to amend their statutes to
make clear that attorney's fees are mandatory rather than discretionary for prevailing
plaintiffs. Of course we also recommend that the five consumer fraud states
(Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, and South Dakota) that currently do not
provide at all for attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff be amended to mandate
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.
A second, more complicated, problem with the attorney's fees provisions in
consumer fraud statutes derives from the secondary goal that some legislatures and
courts have articulated, which is to deter consumers from bringing frivolous or bad
faith claims. Concern has been raised by some commentators'0 5 that consumers and
their attorneys might be taking advantage of the consumer fraud statutes (in
particular, the possibility of punitive damages under some) to bring frivolous cases in
the hope of extracting a settlement from a business with deep pockets." 6 Due to
103See supra Part V.

l°4Our tally of twenty-one mandatory states and twenty-two discretionary states, of course,
does not add up to the forty-five states that provide for attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.
This is because it is difficult to classify the statutes in Arkansas and Nebraska.
l°5See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer
ProtectionActs, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 1 (2005); Sheila B. Scheuerman, supra note 28, at 5.
"'6See Scheuerman, supra note 28, at 2 (focusing on how class action cases under

consumer fraud statutes can be abused and stating that "these class actions become more akin
to corporate blackmail than to consumer protection"); see also Schwartz & Silverman, supra
note 103, at 5 (noting the "flood of 'shakedown' lawsuits against small businesses for
technical violations of state laws or regulations, such as using too small of a font size in
advertisements, even when no one has been harmed"). Schwartz and Silverman also decry the
loosening of the strict common law fraud requirements such as eliminating the requirement to
prove intent to defraud by the defendant (especially if treble damages are being sought) and
the requirement that the plaintiff relied on any false statement. Id. at 67. Although the authors
provide analysis for why plaintiffs should have to show they have been harmed by the false or
deceptive statement, the authors, without any policy or empirical analysis, recommend that
awards of reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs should continue, but be
discretionary, with fees also to be awarded to either a prevailing plaintiff or defendant, when
"exceptional circumstances warrant such an award." Id.at 68. These recommendations are
particularly troubling because they are incorporated in a proposed Model Act on Private
Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes, which was adopted by the "American
Legislative Exchange Council." The American Legislative Executive Council describes itself
in its website as "[a] bi-partisan membership association for conservative state lawmakers who
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concern with the possibility of consumers bringing frivolous cases, twenty-eight
states' consumer fraud statutes require or provide for the possibility of awarding
attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant, but only twenty of these state statutes
clarify that the fees should or can be awarded to prevailing defendants only when the
plaintiffs case is frivolous or in bad faith (the eight states by statute, or court
interpretation of the statute, permit or require a court to award attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant without requiring that the plaintiffs case is frivolous or in bad
faith are: Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada, Oregon, and Rhode
Island). We hypothesized that the possibility of awarding attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant would not only discourage bad faith or frivolous claims but
would also discourage good faith claims and perhaps even strong meritorious claims.
Based upon our survey of consumers and attorneys, this hypothesis proved correct;
both were statistically less willing to bring a strong meritorious case when the
applicable statute permitted a court in its discretion to award attorney's fees to
prevailing defendants, and, among attorneys, also when the statute provided that a
court could only award fees to a prevailing defendant if the plaintiff's claim was
frivolous than if the statute simply awarded attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.
This hypothesis also proved correct from our survey of attorneys in the context of a
"good faith extension of the law" case; attorneys were less likely to bring a "good
faith extension of the law" claim when the statute provided that the prevailing
defendant could recover attorney's fees both in the court's absolute discretion and
when the statute required that the plaintiffs case was frivolous.
Considering the negative impact awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing
defendant has (even when limited to the situation of a frivolous case by the plaintiff)
on the bringing of meritorious cases, one must ask if it is necessary to provide for
this in the consumer fraud statutes in order to curb the filing of frivolous cases. Our
survey results suggest that it is not necessary. Even when the statute only provided
share a common belief in limited government, free markets, federalism, and individual liberty
among America's state legislators" whose list of public and private sector state chairs
according to their website were comprised of fifty-six Republicans, four Democrats, and one
senator not affiliated as a Republican or Democrat. American Legislative Exchange Council,
History, http://www.alec.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2006). The proposed Model Act would only
award attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff if the plaintiff could show that the defendant's
violation of the act was "willful" or with "knowledge" the defendant was violating the act
(only four states currently require this: Hawaii, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Ohio) and
to a prevailing defendant if the plaintiff's case was "groundless in fact or law or brought in
bad faith, or brought for the purpose of harassment." Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 105,
at 71. As the data from our survey of consumers and attorneys reflects, it is important for
attorney's fees provisions in the consumer fraud statutes to be mandatory to a prevailing
plaintiff rather than discretionary in order to achieve the legislative goals of encouraging
meritorious cases, with attorneys rating themselves more likely to bring a meritorious claim
when attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff are mandatory rather than discretionary. Our
data also shows that attorneys are highly unlikely to bring frivolous or bad faith claims (rating
themselves willing only 1.23 on a five point scale), even when the consumer fraud statute does
not provide for attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant, but that attorneys rated themselves
less willing to bring a meritorious case when the consumer fraud statute provided for
attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant. See supra Part V. Thus, we recommend, contrary to
the proposed Model Act, that consumer fraud statutes not include attorney's fees to prevailing
defendants, and instead that states rely on the rules of ethics and civil procedure which already
prohibit and sanction the bringing of frivolous or bad faith claims.
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for attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff, attorneys on average rated themselves
only 1.23 on a scale of 1 to 5 willing to bring a frivolous claim. We suspect that the
reason attorneys are highly unwilling to bring a frivolous case, even when the
consumer fraud statute does not provide for attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant
in a frivolous case, is that there already exist safeguards under the rules of ethics and
civil procedure to prohibit the bringing of frivolous claims that attorneys are aware
of, but consumers might not be.'07
Because attorneys are already adequately dissuaded from bringing a frivolous
claim' and statutory provisions in a consumer fraud act that provide for attorney's
fees to a prevailing defendant are shown to discourage the willingness of consumers
and attorneys to bring meritorious claims, it is better for the consumer fraud statutes
to simply provide for attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs to best achieve both the
primary and secondary legislative goals. We, thus, propose that the twenty-eight
states' consumer fraud statutes that require or provide for the possibility of attorney's
fees to be awarded to a prevailing defendant (Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia)
be amended to delete this language from their statutes, and for those jurisdictions
instead to rely upon the rules of civil procedure and ethics that sanction the bringing
of frivolous cases to deter the filing of frivolous or bad faith cases.

07

1

See supra Part I; see also cases cited supra note 7.

108
1n creating the "bad faith" scenario we emphasized the possibility of extracting a
settlement from the life insurance company, especially in light of the possibility that the
insurance company could fear a large verdict, including possible punitive damages, from a
jury against them to see if any attorneys would be persuaded to raise the claim to obtain this
result. Yet, the attorneys were not so persuaded, contrary to what some commentators have
alleged. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 103, at 24-25; Scheuerman, supra note 103, at
7-8.
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VIII.

APPENDIX: ATTORNEY FEES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS - 50 STATES

State

Statute and First
Year Enacted

Parties

Statute
Language
Indicate

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Standard for
Granting Attorney
Fees

Category I

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Category 5

Category 6

Plaintiff:'

YES

Mandatory

Successful Plaintiff

Mandatoryv

Plaintiff's claim
was frivolous or
brought in bad faith
or for the purposes
of harassment v

Ala.

Deceptive Trade
Practices Act
1981
YES

Defendant:

Alaska

Ariz.No

Ark

[Vol. 56:483

Mandatory

Prevailing Plaintiff

YES

Mandatory

Prevailing at court
rate
OR
Prevailing
reasonable rate"'

Plaintiff:

i
Silent" '

Silent

Silent

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

Plaintiff:

Unfair Trade
Practices and
Consumer
Protection Act
1970

Defendant:

Consumer Fraud
1967

YES

Deceptive
Trade
Practices Act

Plaintiff:

YES

Silent

1971

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Case Law Indicates re:
Category 4, 5,and 6
Search Done 3/2008

Category 7
Verifies:
An award of attorney
fe f attucce
fees for a successful
ii
plaintiff is mandatory

No Case Found

Verifies:
Prevailing plaintiff's
attorney fees are
i
mandatory"

No Case Found

Clarifyirng.
CArnyne:
Attorney Fees"
e
No attorn
No Attorney Fees'

i
Prevailing Plaintiff"
Case law is unclear
whether attorney fees
Previlig
Plintff"
ar attory or
must show actual
'
are mandatory or
damages" '
discretionary""

Silent

No Case Found

Prevailing plaintiff's
attorney fees are
mandatory"'
Qposes:
Prevailing
Defendant's attorney
fees are mandatory""
Verifies:
Prevailing plaintiff
attorney fees

Verifies:
Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Prevailing

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary"

Prevailing and
plaintiff's claim
was brought in bad
'
faith "

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Successful

Consumer Legal

Cal.

Remedies Act
1970

Colorado
Colo.

Plaintiff's claim

ConsumerAct
Protection
196o Awas
Defendant:

YES

Mandatory

groundless and
in bad faith""' or for
the purpose of
harassment
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State

Statute and First
Year Enacted

Parties

Statute
Language
Indicate

Mandatory or
Discretianary

Standardfor
Granting Attorney
Fees

Case Law Indicates re:
Category 4, 5, and 6
Search Done 3/2008

Category I

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Category 5

Category 6

Unfair Trade
Practices Act
1973

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Silent

Conn.

Category 7
Verifies:
Attorney fees at the
discretion of the court.
Plaintiff does not have
to establish
"prevailing party"
status"

Consumer Fraud
Consumer

Del.

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

Not to defendant"'

Plaintiff:

Silent

Silent

Silent

Clarifying:
Attorney fees may not
be awarded if statute

Act

i ieti

1965

Fla.

Florida
Deceptive and
Unfair Trade
Practices Act
1973

Silent

Silent

Silent

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Verifies:
Award of attorney
fees are discretionary
to prevailing party"""
Verifies:
Award of attorney
fees is discretionary to

Injured; Special
provisions
regarding the

prevailing party"""
Clarifying:
Defendant's actions
must have the
potential to harm the

Plaintiff:
Ga.

is silent"
No Case Found

Defendant:

YES

Mandatory

impact of rejection
of settlement""

Fair Business
Practices Act
1973

consumer public, not
just an individual for a
cause of action under
the statute"'

Special provisions
Defendant:

YES

Mandatory

regarding the
impact of settlement

No Case Found

rejection
Discretionary
Plaintiff:
Haw.

knew
Ifthe plaintiff
Defendant:

Plaintiff:
Idaho Consumer
Protection Act
1971

If defendant
willfully engaged in
deceptive trade

No Case Found after
statute amended

practices

Uniform
Deceptive Trade
Practice Act
1969

Idaho

YES

1971plaintiffs
Defendant:

YES

YES

YES

Discretionary

Idiscretionary
the claim is
groundless

Mandatory

Prevailing

Discretionary

Court finds that the
p
action is
spurious or brought
forharassment
o
s
purposes

Verifies:
Attorney fees
to
prevailing Defendant
if Plaintiff knew claim
groundless""'"
Verifies:
Award of attorney i
fees are mandatory- '
Verifies:
Defendants entitled to
attorney fees if case
brought frivolously,
unreasonably or
without foundation
Verifies:
Award of attorney

Ill.

Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive
Business
Practices Act
1961

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

fees is at the sound
discretion of the

court"""

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary
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State

Statute and First
Year Enacted

Parties

Statute
Language
Indicate

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Standardfor
Granting Attorney
Fees

Case Law Indicates re:
Category 4, 5, and 6
Search Done 3/2008

Category I

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Category 5

Category 6

Category 7

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Deceptive
Consumer Sales
Act
1971

Verifies:
Award of attorney
fees is at the court's
discretion-"
Verifies:
Award of attorney
fees is at the court's
'"

Consumer Fraud
Iowa

Plaintiff:

Silent

Silent

Silent

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

Act

Nonex""v

discretionClarifying:
No private right of
action
Clarifyin.:
No private
right of
action'

Plaintiff:
Kan.

Consumer
Protection Act
1973

YES

Discretionary

1973

Prevailing

Verifies:
Award of attorney
fees is at the
discretion xvii
of the
court"

Prevailing and

Verifies:
Award of attorney

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

plaintiff knew claim
was groundless

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Consumer
Kv.

fees is at the
discretion of
the
viii
court
Verifies:
Award of attorney
fees is at the
discretion of the

court-i.

Protection Act

erfies:

1972

Verifies:

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Award of attorney
fees is at the
discretion of the
l

court"

Unfair Trade
Practices and
La.

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Verifies:
Award of attorney
fees shall be awarded

actual damages
have been awarded

for a plaintiff that has
been awarded actual

Consumer

damages"'

Protection Law
1972

Me.

and
Prevailinges

Unfair Trade
Practices Act

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

The action is
groundless, brought
in bad faith or for
purposes of
harassment

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Prevailing

Md.

Opposes:
Awards of attorney
fees are
discretionary"'ii

1969

Consumer
Protection Act
1957

No Case Found

Defendant:

Silent

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Dfdant

YES

Diti

Silent

Silent
Has been awarded
damages
Plaintiff's claim
was brought in bad
faith or is of a

No Case Found
Verifies:
Veies
Attorney fees may be
x i
awarded "
No Case Found

frivolous nature

Regulation of
Business for
Mass.

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Prevailing

Verifies:
Attorney fees aiare

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

No Case Found

mandatory'

Consumer

Protection Act
1967
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State

Statute and First
Year Enacted

Parties

Statute
Language
Indicate

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Standardfor
Granting Attorney
Fees

Category I

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Category 5

Category 6

Consumer
Protection Act
1977

Plaintiff:

YES

Silent

Silent

Mich.

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

Discretionary

Plaintiff must be
injured

Silent

Silent

Silent

Silent

Silent

Silent

Discretionary

Prevailing and
plaintiff's claim is
found to be
frivolous, filed for

Minn.

Prevention of
Consumer Fraud
Act
1963

YES'Wi
Plaintiff:
Defendant:

Case Law Indicates re:
Category 4, 5, and 6
Search Done 3/2008

Category 7
Clarifying:
Attorney fees are
x
mandatory"v
No Case Found
Verifies:
Attorney fees may be
awarded to the
i
plaintiff"" '
No Case Found

Clarifying:

Miss.

Plaintiff:
Regulation of
Business foratoeyfex~
Consumer
Protection Act
1974

YES

Defendant:

the purpose of
harassment or delay

Mo.

Mont.

Neb.

Nev.

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

1973
Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Merchandising
Practices Act
1967

Consumer
Protection Act
1973

Consumer
Protection Act
1974

Deceptive Trade
Practices Act
1973

Regulation of
Business
Practices for
Consumer
Protection Act
1____ 1970

A prevailing plaintiff
may
not befees
awarded
attorney
......

Verifies:
Defending party is
entitled to attorney
x ix

fees. ]

Verifies:
Plaintiff may be
awarded attorney fees'
Clarifling: Plaintiff's
action must be
frivolous,
unreasonable,l i or
groundless
Verifies:
Attorney fees at
court's discretion"'
Clarifying: Plaintiff's
claim was found to be
frivolous, or
unreasonable,
wuhreat foundati ,
even though not
brought in subjective
bad faith
Verifies: Prevailing
Plaintiff entitled to
attorney fees at
l
court's discretion'

Plaintiff:

YES

Silent

Prevailing

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

No Case Found

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Prevailingv

No Case Found

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Prevailing

1

1
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Silent

Silent

Defendant:

Clarifyin :
A prevailing
defendant is entitled
to attorney fees at
court's discretion
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Awards of attorneyi
fees is mandatory'M
No Case Found

1

40

Stark and Choplin: Does Fraud Pay - An Empirical Analysis of Attorney's Fees Provisi
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:493

State

Statute and First
Year Enacted

Parties

Statute
Language
Indicate

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Standardfor
GrantingAttorney
Fees

Case Law Indicates re:
Category 4, 5, and 6
Search Done 3/2008

Category I

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Category 5

Category 6

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Prevailing

N.J.

Trade-Marks
and Unfair
Trade Practices
Act
1960

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

Category 7
Verifies:
Awards of attorney
fees is mandatory for
a prevailing
plaintiff"'
No Case Found

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Prevailing

Defendant:

YES

Mandatory

Plaintiff's action

Clarifying:
A claim is groundless

was groundless"

if it is frivolous under
facts or law"'
Verifies:
Awards of attorney
ii
fees is discretionary"'
No Case Found

Verifies:

Award of attomey.
fees is mandatory

Unfair Trade
N.M.

N.Y.

Practices Act
1953

Consumer
Protection from
Deceptive Acts
and Practices
1970

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent
Defendant

Plaintiff:
NC.

YES

Unlawful Sales
or Advertising
Practices
1965

YES

Discretionary

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Verifies:
Awards of attorne.
x
fees is discretionary "

Defendant
knowingly
committed the
unlawful act

Verifies:
Award of attorney fees
is mandatory if the
defendant knowingly
committed the
unlawful act xvii

Silent

No Case Found

Defendant
-iiiVerifies:
knowigly
An award of attorneyx
committed the
fees is discretionary"i
unlawful act
Verifies:
Plaintiff action is
Veawri
fiares:

Discretionary

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

found
or brought in bad
faith''

fees is
discretionary""ii

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Prevailing

Clarifying: Plaintiff
must show actual
xii i
damages"

fondgroundless"'

Consumer

Protection Act

Unlawful Trade
Practices
Act
1977

Plaintiff should
have known or
knew that the action
was frivolousxvand
malicious

YES

Consumer Sales
Practices Act
1972

1972

fees is discretionary x"

Pmatter

197

Okla.

Awards of attome/

to resolve the

Plaintiff:
Ohio

Verifies:

and unwarranted

refusal by defendant

Consumer

Protection Act
1969
1969
Defendant:

N.D.

Discretionary

willfully"xiii engaged
in the unlawful acts

Defendant:

YES

Mandatory

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

An award of attorney

Plaintiff's action

Verifies:

in bad
was brought
i
faithxl v or was not
well grounded in
fact"'"

The defendant is
allowed attorney fees
if plaintiff's action
i
was in bad faith"'"
Verifies:
A prevailing plaintiff
may be awarded
attorney fees at the

Prevailing

discretion of the
court"'"i
Prevailing but not
Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

allowed in class
actions
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State

Statute and First
Year Enacted

Parties

Statute
Language
Indicate

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Standardfor
GrantingAttorney
Fees

Case Law Indicates re:
Category 4, 5, and 6
Search Done 3/2008

Category I

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Category 5

Category 6

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Silent

Pa.

Unfair Trade
Practices and
Consumer

Category 7
Verifies:
An award of attorney
fees is at the
discretion of
the
v ii i

1968

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

No Case Found

Unfair Trade

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

No Case Found

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

No Case Found

cout Kw

Protection Law

Practice and

R.I.

Consumer
Protection Act
1968

S.C.

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Prevailing

Verifying:
An award of attorney
fees is mandatory for
a prevailing
plaint
g,
Clari ifn_:

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

A prevailing
defendant may not be
awarded attorney
xx

Plaintiff:

Silent

Silent

Silent

No Case Found

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

No Case Found

Discretionary

Defendant violated
the act

Verifies:
An award of attorney
fees is at the
discretion of the
i
courti

Plaintiff's claim is
frivolous, without
legal or factual
t

Verifies:
An award of attorney
fees is at the

Unfair Trade
Practices Act
1962

fees1"

Deceptive Trade
Practices and

S.D.

Consumer
Protection Act
1971

Plaintiff:

Tenn.

YES

Consumer
Protection Act
1977
Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

merit, miior brought

discretion of the

for the purpose of
harassment

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

court

Verifies:
An award of attorney
fees is mandatory for
a prevailing

Prevails

plaintidmv

Tex.

Utah

Deceptive Trade
Practie Actg

Consumer Sales
Act
Practices
1973

If the action
e

Verifies:
Attorney fees are
mandatory if the
plaintiffs action is
groundless, in bad
faith, or brought for
purpose of
x ofi
l
herse
harassmnent"
' "'

v in

fact or law, brought
in bad faith,"'-" or
brought for the
rpoh
o
purpose ofthe
harassment"

Defendant:

YES

Mandatory

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Verifies:
An award of attorney
fees is
discretionary 'Nix

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing and
plaintiff knew his
claim was

Verifies:
Court authorized to
award attorney fees if
the party bringing the

groundless

claim knew it was
I
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State

Statute and First
Year Enacted

Parties

Statute
Language
Indicate

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Standard for
Granting Attorney
Fees

Case Law Indicates re:
Category 4, 5, and 6
Search Done 3/2008

Category I

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Category 5

Category 6

Category 7

YES

Mandatory

Sustains damages or
injuries

Verifies:
An award of attorney
fees is mandatory-

Plaintiff:

Vt.

Va.

Consumer Fraud
Act
1967

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Prevailing

Consumer
Protection Act
1977

Clarifying:
The Consumer Fraud
atde o uhrz
act does not authorize
attorney fees to the
prevailing..
defendant"
Verifies:
The court may award
attorney fees but
damages are a
condition precedent""'

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

Clarifying:
Only a prevailing
plaintiff may be
awarded attorney
feesxcv

Wash.

Consumer
Protection Act
1961

Verifies:
An award of attorney
fees is mandatory..'
Clarifving:
Only a claimant is
allowed to recover

Plaintiff:

YES

Mandatory

Injured

Defendant:

Silent

Silent

Silent

Verifies:
An award of attorney
fees is at the
discretion cvofi the
courtx
Verifies:
An award of attorney
fees is at the
discretion of the

attorney fees'"'

V

Plaintiff:

YES

Discretionary

Defendant's
conduct was
unlawful under the
act and the plaintiff
suffered a loss

Defendant:

YES

Discretionary

aininbarouh the
or for the purpose
ofo herosen
of harassment

Consumer
Credit and
Protection Act
1974

Consumer Act
Wn.A1971

YES

Plaintiff:
Wis_

Consumer
Wvo.

Silent

Plaintiff:

YES

Protection Act

1973

Prevailing

Silent

Silent

No case found after
statute amended

Mandatory

Plaintiff suffered

No Case Found

Silent

Silent

No Case Found

injury shown....

_

Defendant:

Silent

actual damages
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'This table is based upon actions from a private plaintiff and not a governmental plaintiff.
"Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 708 So.2d 111, 122 (Ala. 1997).
"'This table is based upon actions against a private defendant and not a governmental
defendant.
Mandatory means the statute used the language of "shall." Example: "On a finding by the
court that an action or counterclaim under this section was frivolous or brought in bad faith or
for the purpose of harassment, the court shall award to the defendant... reasonable attorney's
fees and costs." ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2008) (emphasis added).
'In interpreting the statute, case law has defined "frivolous" as "an action, claim, or
defense that is 'without substantial justification . . . groundless in fact,groundless in
law,vexatious, or interposed for any improper purpose."' Pac. Enters. Oil Co. v. Howell
Petroleum Corp., 614 So. 2d 409, 418 (Ala. 1993) (quoting ALA. CODE § 12-19-27(1) (1975)
(internal quotation marks omitted)) "[Blad faith" has been equated to "malicious intent." Sam
v. Beaird, 685 So.2d 742, 745 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
viKenai Chrysler Ctr. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1260 (Alaska 2007).
viiThe statute defines "frivolous" as either "(1) not reasonably based on evidence or on

existing law or a reasonable extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; or (2) brought
to harass the defendant or to cause unnecessary delay or needless expense." ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.50.537(e) (2008).
viiiSilent means that the statute does not address the matter.
ixNahom v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 885 P.2d 1113, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
Xld.
XiThomas v. Olson, 220 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Ark. 2005) ("The plain reading of the statute
requires that an award for actual damages or attorney's fees is predicated on prevailing on the
claim or claims asserted.").
ii/d
xiiWallis v. Ford Motor Co., 208 S.W.3d 153, 161 (Ark. 2005) (emphasizing that there
must be "actual damage[s] or injury" for a private litigant to recover pursuant to section 4-88113(f)).
xivBroughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 988 P.2d 67, 74 (1999).
Discretionary means the statute used the language of "may." Example: "Reasonable
attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing defendant upon a finding by the court
that the plaintiffs prosecution of the action was not in good faith." Cal. Civ. Code §
1780(d) (Deering 2008) (emphasis added).
xVICourts have defined "bad faith" as existing when a tactic or action utterly lacks merit.
Dolan v. Buena Eng'rs, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 903, 906 (Ct. App. 1994), alternatively, if the court
finds that the plaintiff had a belief that the claim was meritorious, then there will be a finding
of good faith. Shelton v. Rancho Mortgage & Inv. Corp., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82, 89 (Ct. App.
2002) (quoting Dolan, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 906)).
xviSee Broughton, 988 P.2d at 74.
xViiHolcomb v. Steven D. Smith, Inc., 170 P.3d 815, 817 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) ("Plaintiff
requests attorney fees under [COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(2)(B) (2006)1. This section
mandates costs and reasonable attorney fees in favor of a successful CCPA claimant.").

HeinOnline -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 525 2008

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss3/3

44

Stark and Choplin: Does Fraud Pay - An Empirical Analysis of Attorney's Fees Provisi
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:483

xix"Bad faith" is defined in the statute as "fraudulent, willful, knowing, or intentional
conduct that causes injury." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-113(2)(b)(2.3) (West 2008).
"Groundless" is defined by case law as "a claim or defense ... if the allegations [of] the
complaint, [although] sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, are
not supported by any credible evidence ....
[A claim is groundless if] the proponent has a
valid legal theory[,] but can offer little or [no] evidence to support the claim ....
W. United
Realty v. Isaacs, 679 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Colo. 1984); accord Bilawsky v. Faseehudin, 916 P.2d
586, 590 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
xxFabri v. United Techs. Int'l, 387 F.3d 109, 119, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying
Connecticut law); Heller v. D.W. Fish Realty Co., 890 A.2d 113, 119 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
XXiPrior to a 1976 amendment, the court could award attorney's fees to the defendant in
addition to the plaintiff. Staehle v. Michael's Garage, 646 A.2d 888, 890 n.8 (Conn. App. Ct.
1994). The 1976 amendment deleted fees for a defendant. Id
XxiiStephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1078 (Del. 1983). Under Delaware's
"Lemon Law," DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 5001-09 (2008) "the court, in its discretion, may
award the plaintiffs costs and reasonable attorney's fees or, if the court determines that the
action is brought in bad faith or is frivolous in nature, may award reasonable attorney's fees to
the defendant." § 5005. This provision applies only to breach of an express warranty related
to sale of an automobile. Note also that section § 4909(A)(c) provides that a court may award
"reasonable attorneys' fees" to a customer who successfully sues an automotive repair facility
for repair fraud. These provisions do not technically fall under the Delaware Consumer Fraud
Act, but they do share consumer protection goals.
xx"iiGMAC v. Laesser, 791 So. 2d 517, 520 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
XxivId "
xxvThe statute states:

If the court finds in any action that there has been a violation of this part, the person
injured by such violation shall, in addition to other relief provided for in this Code
section and irrespective of the amount in controversy, be awarded reasonable
attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation incurred in connection with said action;
provided, however, the court shall deny a recovery of attorneys' fees and expenses of
litigation which are incurred after the rejection of a reasonable written offer of
settlement made within 30 days of the mailing or delivery of the written demand for
relief required by this Code section; provided, further, that, if the court finds the action
continued past the rejection of such reasonable written offer of settlement in bad faith
or for the purposes of harassment, the court shall award attorneys' fees and expenses
of litigation to the adverse party.
GA. CODE ANN.

§

10-1-399(d) (2008).

xxviBrown v. Morton, 617 S.E.2d 198, 202, 211 n.17 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
xxviiZanakis-Pico v. Cutter Dodge, Inc., 47 P.3d 1222, 1225 nn.4-5 (Haw. 2002). Note that
the court also mentioned that a court may impose against either party reasonable attorney fees
upon a specific finding that a claim or defense was frivolous. Id. at 1225 n.5 (citing HAW.
REV. STAT. 5 § 607-14.5(a) (1993)). Section 607-14.5(a) has remained unchanged as of the
date of this Article (2008).
xxviiiFenn v. Noah, 133 P.3d 1240, 1246 (Idaho 2006).
xxixld "

xKrautsack v. Anderson, 861 N.E.2d 633, 643 (Il. 2006) (citing Haskell v. Blumthal,
561 N.E.2d 1315, 1316 (111.1990)).
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id. The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices
Act to permit a court in the court's discretion to award a prevailing defendant's attorney's fees
after a showing that Plaintiff's case was in "bad faith" but did not limit bad faith to a Rule 137
situation where sanctions could apply. Id. at 647-49.
"Missi v. CCC Custom Kitchens, 731 N.E.2d 1037, 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(construing IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-4 (2007)).
XxxiiiId"

xxxivThe currently pending "Iowa Consumer Rights Act," would give rise to a private right

of action to an injured consumer and reasonable attorney fees are mandated for a prevailing
plaintiff.
H. File 2142, 82d Gen. Assem. 2008 Sess. (Iowa 2008), available at
http://coolice.legis.state.ia.us/Cool-ICE/default.asp?category=biilinfo&service=billbook&GA
=82&hbill=HF2142) (last visited March 12, 2008).
"XXVMoloOil Co. v. River City Ford Truck Sales, 578 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Iowa 1998)
(confirming that there is no private right of action and therefore there is no right to attorney's
fees).
x viId"
xxxviiEquitable Life Leasing Corp. v. Abbick, 757 P.2d 304, 308 (Kan. 1988).
xxxviiWaggener v. Seever Systems, Inc., 664 P.2d 813, 820-21 (Kan. 1983) (construing
§ 50-634(e)(1982)).
xxxixAlexander v. S & M Motors, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 303, 305 (Ky. 2000).

KAN. STATE. ANN,

XId.
xliPelican Point Operations v. Carroll Childers Co., 807 So.2d 1171, 1178.
XiAdvanced Constr. Corp. v. Pilecki, 901 A.2d 189, 198 ("A person who has suffered a
loss of money or property as the result of an unfair or deceptive trade practice under the
[Unfair Trade Practices Act] may also 'be awarded reasonable attorney's fees."' (quoting ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 213(2) (2006))) (emphasis added). The court deleted "shall" when
quoting the statute. Id.
xliiiHoffman v. Stamper, 843 A.2d 153, 211 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (citing MD. CODE
ANN. COM. LAW § 13-408(b) (LexisNexis 2002)).
xiVSee Hershenow v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, 840 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 2006).

xVThe consumer protection act allows a person who suffers a loss as a result of a violation
of the act to bring an action to recover reasonable attorney fees including fees for services
rendered on appeal. Smolen v. Dahlmann Apartments, Ltd., 463 N.W.2d 261, 263-64 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1990).
Although no "frivolous" language appears in the Michigan Consumer Protection Act
(MCPA), there is a statutory requirement in the state's rules of civil procedure awarding a
prevailing party's attorney's fees where that party makes a motion to recover costs and fees in
connection with a frivolous claim made under the MPCA. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
600.2591(1) (LexisNexis 2008). The civil statute lists three definitions for frivolous, any of
which will satisfy the requirement: (a) that "[t]he party's primary purpose" for filing or
defending the action "was to harass, embarrass, or injure the prevailing party," (b) that there
was no "reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying the party's legal position were in
fact true," or (c) "[t]he party's legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit." Id. (3)(a)(i)(iii).
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xviThe Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act does not specifically provide a

plaintiff with reasonable attorney fees. However, Minnesota's Chapter on Additional Duties
of Attorney General, provides that "any person injured by a violation of any of the laws
referred to in subdivision I may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs
and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney's fees, and receive
other equitable relief as determined by the court." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31(3)(a) (West
2007).
xlviiHutchinson Utils. Comm'n v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 775 F.2d 231, 243 (8th Cir. 1985)
(applying Minnesota law); Yost v. Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826, 831-32 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985).
xviiiWilson v. Nelson Hall Chevrolet, 871 F. Supp. 279, 280 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
xlixld at 280 (applying Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15 (1994)).
'Sunset Pools of St. Louis v. Schaefer, (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.025 (1994)).
"Deadwyler v. Volkswagen of Am., 748 F. Supp. 1146, 1155-56 (W.D.N.C. 1990)
(interpreting Missouri law).
iPlath v. Schonrock, 64 P.3d 984, 991 (Mont. 2003) (construing MONT. CODE ANN. § 3014-133(3)(2003)).
iiTripp v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 112 P.3d 1018, 1025-26 (Mont. 2005) (citing Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). In Tripp, the Montana Supreme Court
adopted the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Christiansburg.Id. at 1025-27.
iVSee Eicher v. Mid Am. Fin. Inv. Corp., 702 N.W.2d 792, 806 (Neb. 2005) (affirming
"that the prevailing plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorney fees under the [Consumer
Protection Act], which permits such an award" under the statute) (construing NEB. REV.
STAT. § 59-1609 (2005)).
IVThe Deceptive Trade Practices Act does not specifically provide attorney fees for a
plaintiff. However, under Nevada's Remedies and Special Actions and Proceedings statute,
the section on Actions by Victims of Fraud provides that "[a]n action may be brought by any
person who is a victim of consumer fraud .... [I]f the claimant is the prevailing party, the
court shall award him... [h]is costs in the action and reasonable attorney's fees." NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41.600(1)-(3) (LexisNexis 2008).
IviThe court in State ex rel. List v. Courtesy Motors, 590 P.2d 163, 166 (Nev. 1979),
affirmed the lower court's refusal to grant attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in an
action by the state and state agencies for deceptive trade practices. In so holding, the court
stated, because the statute in Nevada is silent as to whether a defendant is entitled to attorney's
fees when it is the prevailing party, it is within the court's discretion to award the fees. Id.
Therefore the lower court did not commit error in refusing attorney's fees to the prevailing
defendant, stating "[w]e have repeatedly held that attorney's fees may not be awarded in the
absence of a statute, rule or contract which so provides." Id. (citing Consumers League of
Nev. v. Southwest Gas, 576 P.2d 737 (1978)).
viiCarter v. Lachance, 766 A.2d 717, 719 (N.H. 2001) (citing Whispering Springs tenant
Ass'n v. Barrett, 624 A.2d 1345, 1349 (N.H. 1983)).
IviiiCox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 465 (N.J. 1994) (construing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56-:8-19 (West 1994)).
'Knight v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 3 F.3d 1398, 1403 (10th Cir. 1993).
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i"'Groundless" has been defined by the New Mexico Supreme Court as "frivolous."
G.E.W. Mech. Contractors v. Johnston Co., 858 P.2d 103, 109 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). This
court further provided that this means "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing.., which includes a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." Id. (quoting N.M.
R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-301)). Another definition for "frivolous" offered by the court in a
separate action under the Unfair Trade Practices Act was "without merit." Cutter Flying Serv.
v. Straughan Chevrolet, Inc., 459 P.2d 350, 353 (N.M. 1969).
LiMarchman v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 898 P.2d 709, 728 (N.M. 1995) (construing
"groundless" in light of G.E. W. Mech., 858 P.2d at 109).
ixiilndep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Maxi-Aids, 25 F. Supp. 2d 127, 131-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(citing Beslity v. Manhattan Honda, 120 Misc. 2d 848 (N.Y.S.2d 1983)).
ixiiThe North Carolina Court of Appeals has defined "willfully" as "something more than
an intention to do a thing. It implies doing the act purposely and deliberately, indicating a
purpose to do it, without authority-careless whether [the defendant] has the right or not-in
violation of law." Envirosafe Paints, Inc. v. Conklin, No. COA-04-1234, 2005 N.C. App.
LEXIS 1757, at **8-9 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2005) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 278 S.E.2d 260,
264 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)), aff'd, 616 S.E.2d 693 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
xivBlankenship v. Town & Country Ford, 622 S.E.2d 638, 643 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)
(citing Barbee v. Atl. Marine Sales & Serv., 446 S.E.2d 117, 121 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)).
lXVThe two terms "frivolous" and "malicious" go together and are defined, respectively, as
a claim where "a proponent can present no rational argument based upon the evidence or law
in support of [it]" and a claim that is "wrongful and one intentionally without just cause or
excuse or as a result of ill will." Blyth v. McCrary, 646 S.E.2d 813, 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007)
(quoting Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 562 S.E.2d 92, 94 (2002).
lXViBasnight v. Diamond Developers, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 589, 592 (M.D.N.C. 2001)
(construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2001)).
lxviiJorgenson v. Agway, Inc., 627 N.W.2d 391, 393-94 (N.D. 2001) (citing N.D. CENT.
CODE.

§ 51-15-09 (2001)).

ixviii"[K]nowingly merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the

offense." Charvat v. Ryan, 879 N.E.2d 765, 770 (Ohio 2007) (quoting Bryan v. United States,
524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Einhorn v. Beau
Townsend Ford, Inc., No. CA10835, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2645, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 28, 1988) (.'[K]nowingly committed' for purposes of an award of attorney's fees
pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(F) [Ohio's Consumer Sales Practices Act], means that the supplier
knows, at the time of its act or practice, that that act or practice violates Chapter 1345." (citing
Bierlein v. Alex's Cont'l Inn, 475 N.E.2d 1273 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984))).
ixixEinhom v. Beau Townsend Ford Motor Co., 548 N.E.2d 933, 935 (Ohio 1990)
(construing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(F)(2) (LexisNexis 1988)).
IxxThe Ohio Appeals Court has defined "'groundless' for purposes of assessing attorney
fees, if the allegations in the complaint, while sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, are not supported by credible evidence at trial." Palmer v. Daniel Troth
& Son Builders, 97APE08-1050, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2211, at *13-14 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 19, 1988) (citing Bilawsky v. Faseehudin, 916 P.2d 586, 590 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995)).
"This test assumes that the proponent has a valid legal theory but can offer little or nothing in
the way of evidence to support the claim." Id.(citing Bilawsky, 916 P.2d at 590).
'iFurther, the court defines "bad faith" as
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[a] lack of good faith . . . and bad faith, although not susceptible of concrete
definition, embraces more than bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrong-doing, breach of a known duty through
some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud. It also embraces the
actual intent to mislead or deceive another.
Id. at *16 (quoting Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins., 187 N.E.2d 45, 2 of the Syllabus (Ohio
1962)).
""'Parker v. I & F Insulation Co., 730 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Ohio 2000) (citing Tanner v. Tom
Harrigan Chrysler Plymouth, 613 N.E.2d 650 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)). But see Duckworth v.
Burger King, Corp., 824 N.E.2d 592, 599 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) ("[B]ecause Burger King
prevailed on its statute of limitations defense," and because it alleged attorney's fees as a
counterclaim, "it was the 'prevailing party' within the meaning of R.C. 1345.09(F) and 'may'
be entitled to attorney fees under that statute.").
IxxiiTibbets v. Sight'n Sound Appliance Ctrs, 77 P.3d 1042, 1046 (Okla. 2003).
lxxiv"Bad faith" as discussed in Green Bay Packaging v. PreferredPackaging,932 P.2d

1091 (Okla. 1996) is when "a claim is made for 'oppressive, abusive, or wasteful' reasons."
Id. at 1098-99 (quoting Beard v. Richards, 820 P.2d 812, 816 (Okla. 1991)). The court further
reasoned that "[b]ad faith involved the intent of the actor who brought the claim[, not] the
quality or the quantity of the evidence presented." Id. at 1099.
1xxvThe statute further states that the defendant can also be awarded attorney fees if the
plaintiff's claim "was unwarranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 761.1(A) (West 2008).
xxviWhitlock v. Bob Moore Cadillac, Inc., 938 P.2d 737, 737 (Okla. 1997) (construing §
761.1(A)).
lxxviielfrey v. Kuni Cadillac, Inc., 619 P.2d 662, 663 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
lxxviiHammer v. Nikol, 659 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995); Sewak v. Lockhart,
699 A.2d 755, 761 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
'xxixTaylor v. Medenica, 503 S.E.2d 458, 460 (S.C. 1998) (construing S.C.

CODE

ANN. §

39-5-140(a) (1998)).
lXXXd
"
IxxxiMiller v. United Automax, 166 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tenn. 2005) (construing TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(e) (1995)).
xxxThe court in Glanton v. Bob Parks Realty, in defining "'without legal or factual
merit,"' did not interpret the term "to mean without sufficient merit to prevail, but rather as so
utterly lacking in an adequate factual predicate or legal ground as to make the filing of such a
claim highly unlikely to succeed." No. M2003-011440COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS
263, at *30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2005) (quoting § 47-18-109(e)(2)).
xxxiiiDon Smith Ford, Lincoln-Mercury v. Bolinger, No. E2003-02764-COA-R3-CV, 2005
Tenn. App. LEXIS 172, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2005).
LxxxivCont'l Dredging, Inc. v. De-Kaizered, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 380, 396 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003)
(citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 2003)).
Ixxx"Groundless" has been interpreted to mean "[a claim having] no basis in law or fact,
and not warranted by any good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law." See, e.g., Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, 775 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex.
1989) (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 13; accord McDuffie v. Blassingame, 883 S.W.2d 329, 335
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(Tex. App. 1994)); Mosk v. Thomas, 183 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex. App. 2003). Further, the
standard used in "determining whether a suit is groundless is 'whether the totality of the
tendered evidence demonstrates an arguable basis in fact and law for the consumer's claim."'
Schlager v. Clements 939 S.W.2d 183, 190 (Tex. App. 1996) (quoting Splettstotter v. Myer,
779 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. 1989)). Additionally, "[tlhe court may consider evidence that is
legally inadmissible or subject to other defects in making this determination if there is some
good faith belief that the tendered evidence might be admissible or that it could reasonably
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id.(citing Donwerth, 775 S.W.2d at 637).
Ixxxi"A suit is brought in bad faith if it is motivated by malicious or discriminatory
purpose." Schlager, 939 S.W.2d at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted); McDuffie, 883
S.W.2d at 335; Cent. Tex. Hardware v. First City Texas-Bryan, 810 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Tex.
App. 1991).
lxxxvii"[F]or purposes of harassment" has been interpreted to mean that a case "was brought
for the sole purpose of harassment." Donwerth, 775 S.W.2d at 638. Another court has noted
that "'[blecause any purpose for recovering money damages, however small, as a motivating
factor would defeat such a finding, it is difficult to conceive of a case which was not
groundless but was brought for purposes of harassment."' Rutherford v. Riata Cadillac Co.,
809 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. App. 1991) (quoting Donwerth, 775 S.W.2d at 638).
Ixxxviiilntertex, Inc. v. Cowden, 728 S.W.2d 813, 820 (Tex. App. 1986) (construing §
1750(c)).
xxxixAndreason v. Felsted, 137 P.3d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (construing UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-11-19(5) (2006)).
XcBuzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 953 (Utah 1996) (citing §
13-11-19(5)).
xciGramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Starling, 470 A.2d 1157, 1162 (Vt. 1983);
L'Esperance v. Benware, 830 A.2d 675, 683 (following Gramatan).
xciiState v. Whitingham Sch. Bd., 438 A.2d 394, 408-10 (Vt. 1981).
xcPiiitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, 212 F. Supp. 2d 613, 621 (W.D.Va. 2002)
(granting of damages after an adjudication on the merits of a claim is a condition precedent to
an award of attorney's fees); see also Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 384 F. Supp. 2d
915, 918 (E.D.Va. 2005) ("[Virginia Consumer Protection Act] attorney's fees and court costs
'may be awarded' in addition to damages ...[The Truth-in-Lending Act], however, directs
the Court to award attorney's fees and costs." (quoting VA. CODE ANN. 59.1-204 (Michie
2004)) (emphasis added).
xivPitchford, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
xcvState v. Black, 676 P.2d 963, 970 (Wash. 1984) (construing WASH. REV. CODE §

19.86.090 (1984)).
xciSato v. Century 21 Ocean Shores Real Estate, 681 P.2d 242, 245 (Wash. 1984)
(construing § 19.86.090).
xcviiChevy Chase Bank v. McCamant, 512 S.E.2d 217, 227 (W. Va. 1998).
xcviiiId

xcixFirst Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Nicolaou, 335 N.W.2d 390, 396 (Wis. 1983) (citing In re E.B.,

330 N.W.2d 584, 590 (Wis. 1983)).
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